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The majority of insured Americans obtain health insurance coverage
through employment as a non-portable fringe benefit. The link between health
insurance coverage and employment could have potential important implica-
tions on workers’ labor market decisions. My dissertation consists of three
chapters that contribute to the understanding of the interaction between health
insurance and workers’ job mobility.
My first chapter studies the effect of the state dependent coverage man-
dates on the job mobility of young adults. Prior to the Affordable Care Act,
many states had already implemented insurance mandates that extended the
age that young adults could gain access to parental health insurance, an al-
ternative insurance source which is not contingent on employment. If young
workers with employer-sponsored insurance (ESI) are locked into less preferred
jobs for fear of losing health benefits, expanded dependent coverage is expected
to reduce the job lock and increase mobility. Expanded eligibility could also
decrease mobility among those who are pushed out of a better matched but
uninsured job in search of access to ESI (job push). Using Survey of Income
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and Program Participation (SIPP) 2000-2010 data, the impact of the state
mandates on job mobility is identified by a triple-difference framework that
exploits the state level dependent coverage variations in eligibility criteria,
mandate implementation states, and mandate implementation time. Results
show that expanded dependent coverage led to a 5% decrease in the mobility
of workers with no ESI (job push). I find no evidence of reduced job lock.
The second chapter of my dissertation extends the analysis of my first
chapter to the Affordable Care Act (ACA) Dependent Coverage Mandate.
The ACA Dependent Coverage Mandate was passed on March 23rd, 2010, and
became effective on September 23, 2010. The mandate requires that health
insurance plans that provide dependent coverage must cover dependents until
the age of 26. Using SIPP 2008-2013 data, and both difference-in-difference
framework and regression discontinuity design, I find consistent evidence of
reduced job push and no evidence of reduced job lock. The estimated reduced
job push is larger than the state analysis.
The third chapter studies the impact of the ACA Medicaid expansion on
childless adults’ job mobility. The ACA Medicaid expansion raised the Medi-
caid income eligibility threshold to 138% of the Federal Poverty Line (FPL) for
everyone including childless adults who were not the traditional beneficiaries
of the Medicaid. 32 states adopted the expansion while 19 states opted out.
The reform could potentially increase childless adults’ job mobility if they are
“locked” in their jobs for fear of losing employer-sponsored health insurance.
Using the 2011-2016 basic monthly Current Population Survey (CPS), this
vii
paper tests this hypothesis by comparing the job mobility of childless adults
in expansion states to those residing in non-expansion states, before and af-
ter the expansion. Results show the existence of “job lock” effect: the ACA
Medicaid expansion increased the childless adults’ job mobility by 7% - 9%,
and the increase comes entirely from job-to-job transitions. I find no evidence
of the “employment lock”: the availability of Medicaid did not cause childless
adults to be more likely to become unemployed or leave the labor force.
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Chapter 1
State Expanded Dependent Insurance
Coverage and the Job Mobility of Young
Adults
1.1 Introduction
The majority of insured Americans obtain health insurance coverage
through employment as a non-portable fringe benefit. Employer-sponsored
health insurance (ESI) is the predominant source of private health insurance
because it is less costly than coverage purchased from the individual market.
The lower cost of ESI is the result of the economies of scale with group pur-
chasing, reduced adverse selection, and the benefit of income tax exemption.
While most private insurance plans are linked to employment, employers differ
significantly in both the availability of insurance offering and the generosity of
plan offered, because the cost of providing health benefits varies considerably
among employers. Approximately 57% of firms, most of which are large firms,
offer health insurance to their employees (Source: Employer Health Benefits
Survey).
In theory, the link between employment and insurance coverage could
lead to inefficient job matches; because insurance is valued differently across
workers, its cost of provision differs across employers, and employers cannot
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offer individualized health benefits to each employee. Workers may choose less-
matched jobs with preferred ESI over better-matched jobs with less-preferred
or no ESI. “Job lock” refers to the situation in which workers decide to stay in
less-matched jobs that they would otherwise leave out of fear of losing employee
benefits. On the other hand, rather than being locked into a job, a worker
with no ESI and in need of coverage may be pushed out of a well-matched job
in which they would otherwise remain. This phenomenon is referred to as “job
push”. Job lock has received much attention in the past two decades. Many
anecdotes and media reports support the existence of job lock.1 However,
empirical studies provide little consensus on the existence and the significance
of job lock. Depending on the data set and identification strategy employed,
job lock is estimated to be large (e.g., Madiran,1994; Gruber and Madrian,
1994; Anderson, 1998), moderate (e.g., Hamersma and Kim, 2009; Bansak
and Raphael, 2005), small, or non existent (e.g., Holtz-Eakin, 1994; Kapur,
1997; Sanz-De-Galdeano, 2006). Job push has received much less attention
compared to job lock.
There have been legislative efforts that attempted to address the job
lock problem. Both the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
(COBRA 1985) and HIPAA of 1996 were attempts to make ESI relatively
consistent and portable for workers between job changes. The concerns over
job lock also contributed to the passage of the Affordable Care Act (ACA
1A survey conducted by the Employee Benefit Research Institute revealed that 27% of
workers still reported experiences of job lock even after the passage of the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA 1996).
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2010). One important goal of the ACA is to increase the availability of health
insurance plans not linked to one’s job. It is widely reported that ACA cures
job lock, although there is no empirical evidence to support this claim. The
ACA dependent coverage mandate, which became effective on Sep 23, 2010, is
one of the earliest provisions of the ACA. It largely increases access to health
insurance for young adults by allowing them to stay on their parents’ health
insurance plans until the age of 26. Similar mandates were implemented in
more than half of states before the ACA dependent coverage mandate became
effective.
The federal mandate and state mandates provide a novel opportunity
to assess the job lock and job push of young adults. The law changes may
increase the job mobility of workers with ESI if they are “locked” into their
current job for fear of losing ESI and decrease the job mobility of workers
without ESI if they are “pushed” out of their current job when seeking jobs
with ESI. Using data from the 2001, 2004, and 2008 panels of Survey of In-
come and Program Participation (SIPP), the impact of the state mandates
on job mobility is identified by a difference-in-difference-in-difference (DDD)
framework that exploits the state-level dependent coverage variations in eligi-
bility criteria, mandate implementation states, and mandate implementation
times. Results show a moderate decrease in overall job mobility among young
adults led by the mandates. I find a small, insignificant change in job mobility
of young workers with ESI (job lock) while I find that the mandates led to a
significant decrease in the mobility of young workers with no ESI (job push).
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I supplement the state mandates analysis with the ACA mandate analysis in
the second chapter which yields consistent estimates that indicate the mandate
led to reduction in job push and no change on job lock.
This study contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First,
this paper is the first to provide evidence of the impact of both state and
federal dependent coverage mandates on young adults’ job mobility. Bailey
(2015) is the only research that investigated the similar issue prior to this study.
Using Current Population Survey (CPS) and DD strategy, Bailey concluded
that the ACA mandate had no effect on job mobility. However, Slusky (2013)
questioned the validity of the identification strategy that compares 19 to 25-
year-olds to 16 to 18 and 27 to 30-years-olds because different broad age groups
are often subject to different economic shocks and thus reflect different trends.
In this paper, I focus on prior state-level mandates, which provide a much
richer source of policy variations. By exploiting the state-level variations, I am
able to invoke much weaker identification assumptions. In the second chapter,
I use DD with narrower age bandwidths as suggested by Slusky (2013) and a
RD design to study the impact of the ACA Dependent Coverage Mandate.
Second, this study separately analyzes job lock and job push and pro-
vides evidence of the existence of job push. Almost all related literature either
does not distinguish between the two or focuses on job lock. To my knowl-
edge, only Anderson (1997) and Hamersma and Kim (2009) studied job push
separately from job lock. The distinction between job lock and job push is
meaningful, as noted by Anderson (1997), since they have different policy
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implications. Studying the job push effect of young adults is especially impor-
tant, because compared to older workers, young adults are more likely to have
jobs that do not provide ESI. In my sample, about 57% of the young workers
are not covered by ESI. This proves significantly higher than the 25.6%2 (Em-
ployee Benefit Research Institution (EBRI), 2010) of workers age 18-64 who
were not covered by ESI in 2010.
Third, this study focuses on the relatively younger working cohort, a
less studied and yet very important group. Prior literatures focused on elderly
or all working-age workers. Job lock and job push may not affect individuals
with different ages uniformly. Job lock and job push could be less for young
adults since they have lower health care costs. However, young adults generally
have less income than older workers, and job lock and job push may be more
severe for low-income individuals who are less likely to obtain ESI across a
job change. Also, as mentioned, young adults have a significantly higher rate
of workers without health care coverage, which implies that their job mobility
effects could be very different from older workers. Studying the interaction
between young adults’ health insurance coverage and labor market decisions
is particularly important because job matches at early periods of one’s career
may have a significant effect on later career trajectories.
This chapter unfolds as follows. The next section discusses the back-
ground of the state-level mandates. Section 3 discusses previous work on health
2This number excludes those who receive public health insurance.
5
insurance and job mobility. Section 4 outlines a regression framework for how
extending dependent coverage affect job mobility of young adults. Section 5
describes the data. Section 6 presents and discusses the estimates of the state
mandate analysis. Section 7 concludes.
1.2 State Mandates to Expand Dependent Coverage
Young adults between the age of 19 and 30 have the highest uninsured
rate among all age cohorts in the United States. Loss of insurance occurs
at two transition ages: 19th birthday or high school graduation, and college
graduation. Eligibility for public provided plans such as Medicaid and the
State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) phase out at age 19.
Employer sponsored insurance plans usually cover dependents until age 19 or
age 23 if young adults are enrolled full-time in school3. Before states and
federal efforts to extend dependent coverage, young adults faced particular
challenges in obtaining coverage. For most of them the only source of health
insurance was through their jobs. The ACA Dependent Coverage Mandate,
which was implemented in September 2010, expand the dependent coverage
to young adults under the age of 26.
The extension of dependent coverage for young adults originated in
state legislatures. Prior to the implementation of the ACA’s Dependent Cov-
erage Provision, 34 states have passed similar laws that increase the age of
3Firms have strong incentive to follow such rules since employer-sponsored health plan
is tax free up to those ages according to the IRS.
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dependency since 1995. These state laws vary considerably by implementa-
tion date, age limit, and other eligibility criteria. Table 1 shows the details of
the state law variations. While most states raise the age limit for both stu-
dents and non-students4, some states (CT, GA, LA, NV, RI, SD) only raise
the age limit for students and some (DE, IN, IA, NM) only raise the age limit
for non-students. It is common for states to have an age limit lower than 26,
typically 24 or 25. However, several states (NE, NJ, NY, OH, PA, WI) set
the maximum age higher than 26 years old for non-students. The state laws
also vary by how they define “dependent.” Most state mandates are restricted
to unmarried young adults. Four states (FL, ME, NJ, PA) also require that
young adults must not have children of their own to qualify for the benefit.
State mandates are weaker than the federal mandate, not only because
most state mandates have lower age limits and extra eligibility criteria, but
most importantly because state mandates do not apply to all private health
insurance plans. None of the state laws apply to self-insured plans. Under
the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA 1974), self-
insured plans are exempt from state insurance regulations. Per the Medical
Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) 2014 Insurance Component, 37.2% private
sector firms offer self-insured plans. Among all workers who hold private health
insurance, 59.7% are enrolled in self-insured plans.
4Full time students, and non full time students
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1.3 Literature
1.3.1 Job Mobility and Health Insurance
This chapter is related to two strands of literature. The first strand
studies the interaction between job mobility and health insurance. During
the past decade, a substantial and growing body of work has investigated the
extent to which ESI discourages workers from changing jobs, also known as
the “job lock effect.” In general, the literature comes to conflicting conclusions.
The main challenge for the literature is to find an identification strategy that
overcomes the endogeneity problem of ESI. A simple comparison between the
job mobilities of workers with and without ESI does not prove the existence
of job lock because ESI may be associated with other job characteristics and
individual unobserved characteristics that are likely to affect job mobility.
The most popular identification strategy is to use spousal health in-
surance. Madrian(1994) utilized the National Medical Expenditure Survey
(NMES) and a difference-in-difference strategy that compared the job turnover
between workers who have access to spousal health insurance and those who
do not. Madrian identified job lock by showing that workers who do not have
access to spousal insurance are 15-25% less likely to leave their jobs. Research
that used similar strategies with different data sets confirmed Madrian’s find-
ings (Anderson 1997, Monheit and Cooper 1994, Buchmeuller and Valletta
1996, etc.) except for Holtz-Eakin (1994) who used Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID) and failed to find any evidence of job lock. Although Gru-
ber and Madrian (2002) questioned the choices of PSID and CPS as data
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sources to study job lock because of the possibility of serious measurement
errors in job turnover exist in these two data sets.
Madrian’s identification strategy was criticized not only because the
endogeneity of spousal health insurance, but also because her identification
replies on comparing workers with and without ESI. However, workers with
and without ESI can be very different (i.e. workers who value ESI may also
value stability). Several studies (Kapur 1998, 2004; Stoupe et al. 2001) ad-
justed the strategy by adding health status or expected medical expenditures
as another source of variation. However, these papers found small and statis-
tically insignificant effect of health insurance on job mobility.
Instead of directly identifying job lock, more recent studies took advan-
tage of arguably exogenous health insurance policy changes to overcome the
endogeneity problem. These studies generally found moderate effects that only
influenced certain population groups. Gruber and Madrian (1994) found that
COBRA in 1985 increased job turnover by 10%. However, Sanz-de-Galdeano
(2006) found insignificant effect of HIPAA of 1996 related job lock. Hamersma
and Kim (2009) used post-1996 changes in state Medicaid eligibility cutoffs and
found that access to Medicaid reduced job turnover only among unmarried
women. Bansak and Raphael (2005) found that the State Children’s Health
Insurance Program (SCHIP) in the late 1990s led to a 5-6% increase in job
turnover of men without independently insured wives. Bailey (2016) found
that the ACA dependent coverage mandate has no effect on job mobility and
job lock.
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Compared to job lock, job push was much less studied. This phe-
nomenon was first introduced in Anderson (1998). Anderson found that a
larger portion of job lock effect in previous studies such as in Madrian (1994)
can be better categorized as job push. Only two studies (Hamersma and Kim
2009; Barkowski 2014) separately analyzed job lock and job push since then,
and they both failed to find evidence of job push.
1.3.2 Extended Dependent Coverage and Labor Market
This paper also relates to a more recent strand of literature that studies
the impact of extended dependent coverage on young adults’ labor market out-
comes. The consensus is that extended dependent coverage only affects young
adults’ labor supply on intensive margin, not on extensive margin. Antwi,
Moriya, and Simon (2013) found that ACA Dependent Coverage Mandate re-
duced hours worked and probability of full-time worker of young adults aged
19-25 compared to those who are older and younger. Several studies (Depew
2014, Hulbert 2012) confirmed their findings using prior state laws variation
and DDD strategy. Heim, Luri, and Simon (2014) used tax records to iden-
tify eligible young adults whose parents have ESI, and found that the law
had no effect on young adults’ extensive labor supply and wage. Dillender
(2014) used variation in state laws and estimated the long-run effect of the
law that those who experienced dependent coverage extension before turn-
ing 18 had higher educational attainment and higher wages. Both Bailey
(2013) and Dolan (2016) found limited or no impact of the law changes on
10
self-employment.
1.4 Methodology
1.4.1 Theoretical Effects of Expanded Dependent Coverage on Job
Mobility
The link between health insurance coverage and employment could have
potential important implications on workers’ labor market decisions, especially
job entries and exits. Gruber (2000) shows that, in theory, ESI could lead to
inefficient job matches. Unlike wage, which is also part of a worker’s compen-
sation package, insurance is valued differently across workers, and its cost of
provision differs across employers. Also, employers cannot offer individualized
health benefits to each employee. These features suggest that workers may
value ESI more than the wage differential between comparable jobs with and
without ESI. Consequentially, workers could choose less well-matched jobs with
ESI over higher-paying jobs (or higher-paying self-employment) without ESI.
The inefficient job matches could occur even within insurance-providing sec-
tors. This is because: (a) firms vary in generosity of health benefits provided,
(b) the new employer can discriminate against pre-existing conditions for up
to a year as allowed under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act (HIPAA)5, and (c) costs may arise with switching plans, such as losing
previous expenses as credit toward deductibles and out-of-pocket maximums.
5The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) limits the
ability of a group health plan to discriminate against preexisting conditions. However,
“group health plans may refuse to provide benefits relating to preexisting conditions for a
period of 12 months after enrollment in the plan or 18 months in the case of late enrollment.”
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In addition to job switching decisions, ESI could also affect the decision of en-
tering and leaving the labor force because private health insurance purchased
from the individual market proves more expensive than ESI.
For workers with ESI, the potential distortion of ESI on job mobility is
referred to as “job lock,” a term that refers to the situation in which employ-
ees decide to stay in less-matched jobs that they would otherwise leave out of
fear of losing employee benefits. Job lock reduces job mobility by discourag-
ing workers from changing jobs, working part time, starting businesses, and
leaving the labor force. Job lock has received much attention in the past two
decades. Many anecdotes and media reports support the existence of job lock.6
However, empirical studies provide little consensus on the existence and the
significance of job lock. Depending on the data set and identification strategy
employed, job lock is estimated to be large (e.g., Madiran,1994; Gruber and
Madrian, 1994; Anderson, 1998), moderate (e.g., Hamersma and Kim, 2009;
Bansak and Raphael, 2005), or small or non existent (e.g., Holtz-Eakin, 1994;
Kapur, 1997; Sanz-De-Galdeano, 2006). On the other hand, rather than being
locked into a job, a worker with no ESI and in need of coverage maybe pushed
out of a well-matched job in which they would otherwise remain. This phe-
nomenon is referred to as “job push” (Anderson, 1997; Hamersma and Kim,
2009). Job push increases mobility by encouraging changes toward jobs that
provide ESI. Job push is the mirror image of job lock, but comparatively has
6A survey conducted by the Employee Benefit Research Institute revealed that 27% of
workers still reported experiences of job lock even after the passage of the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA 1996).
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received much less attention. The expanded dependent coverage may increase
the job mobility of workers with ESI if they are “locked” into their current job
for fear of losing ESI and decrease the job mobility of workers without ESI if
they are “pushed” out of their current job in search of jobs with ESI.
1.4.2 Empirical Approaches
To estimate the impact of dependent coverage mandates on job mo-
bility of young adults, I analyze the state mandates in this chapter and the
federal mandate in the next chapter. Compared to the federal mandate, the
state-dependent coverage policy changes provide a much richer source of vari-
ation that help elucidate the causal relationship. Unlike the ACA mandate
implemented on the same day for all states, states law changes occured in dif-
ferent states at different times. This helped to alleviate the concern that job
mobility changes were driven by contemporary labor market changes. More-
over, for states that implemented the mandate, the age limit and eligibility
criteria vary considerably. The variation from age limit and eligibility criteria
helps lessen the concern that contemporary labor market changes for certain
groups of young adults were driving the results.
The state dependent coverage mandates vary over time, across states,
and by eligibility criteria. These variations allow for a difference-in-difference-
in-difference (DDD) identification strategy. I compare eligible young adults
in states that passed mandates to similarly aged but ineligible young adults
in the same states, and control for the same difference for states that did not
13
pass such mandates.
I estimate the impact of extended dependent coverage using the fol-
lowing probit regression for individual i with eligibility e in state s at time
t.
Yiest = Φ(α+β1(Eligibleist×Mandatest)+β2Xist+θst+γes+λet+εist) (1.1)
In this specification, Φ(.) is a standard cumulative normal distribution
function. Following earlier literatures on job mobility and also because job
separation is a relatively rare event, I use a probit regression instead of a lin-
ear regression. Yiest is the outcome variable (e.g. job separation, insurance
coverage) for individual i with eligibility e in state s at time t. For job sepa-
ration, Yist is a dummy variable that equals one if individual i separate from
main job in state s and time t. Eligibleist is a dummy variable that takes value
one if individual i in state s that has the state mandate and he or she meets
the mandate requirement. Mandatest takes value of one for a state s that has
a mandate in place at time t. Xist includes a set of demographic controls:
sex, race, age, education, marital status, and indicator of having children. I
also control for spouse characteristics of whether the spouse has ESI or not.
Since jobs that provide health insurance may have other preferred aspects that
affect job mobility, I add controls for job characteristics including log hourly
wage, union status, firm size, occupation, and industry. To adjust for the fact
that some individuals may have higher propensities of job separation, I add
job tenure as one of the controls. I control for the economic condtions by
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adding the unemployment rate. Lastly, since it is a DDD framework, I add
a full set of interaction effects: state-by-time, state-by-age, state-by-married,
state-by-children, time-by-age, time-by-married, time-by-children.
The coefficient of interest is β1, which measures the impact of becoming
eligible for extended dependent coverage on the job mobility of young adults.
Since job lock and job push have opposite implications on how job mobility
changes in response to the mandates, I separately analyze job lock and job
push by restricting the sample to workers with and without ESI own-name
and using the same regression as in (1.1).
The estimation of β1 suffers from attenuation bias because state man-
dates only apply to fully-insured plans while self-insured plans are exempt
from state laws. To account for this bias, I introduce the state-year level per-
centage of workers in fully-insured plans into the regression which is indicated
by the following:
Yiest = Φ(α + β1(Eligibleist ×Mandatest × FULLinsst) + β2Fullinsst + β3Xist
+θst + γes + λet + εist)
(1.2)
Where Fullinsst is the percentage of workers (of all ages) enrolled in
fully insured plans in state s at time t. I construct Fullinsst from the differ-
ence of the percentage of workers who have private health insurance and the
percentage of workers who are self-insured. These data are collected from the
Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) Insurance Component. Fullinsst
varies considerably both across states and over time. The added variation
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measures the intensity of the mandate in each state over time. β1 now can be
interpreted as the overall impact of gaining access to parents’ health insurance
plans on job mobility of young adults whose parents have fully insured plans.
1.5 Data
The data of this chapter come from the 2001, 2004, 2008 panels of the
Survey of Income and Program Participation from years 2000 to 2010. The
SIPP is a national representative panel survey that collects information on the
economic and demographic characteristics of individuals and is designed to
study program eligibility and participation. Each panel covers 3-4 years and
surveys completely separate samples of individuals. At the beginning of each
panel, the SIPP selects interviewees by randomly choosing homes and people
who lived there. The SIPP follows them over time until the end of the panel,
even if they move out of the house. Each panel is divided into “waves” of four-
month long periods. Interviewees are divided into four rotation groups and
each group is interviewed one by one on a rotating basis over each wave. During
interviews, interviewers collect information on the previous four months of the
interviewees. More information on the SIPP data structure is in the Appendix.
SIPP is arguably the best data source available on job mobility. In
each wave, respondents provide information for up to two jobs held during
the previous four months. Each job’s characteristics are collected, such as job
starting date and end date, hourly wage, tenure, hours worked, union status,
firm size, industry, and occupation. Compared to CPS or PSID in which job
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separation is derived from past employment records, SIPP offers an explicit
measure of job separation. SIPP also contains information on individual health
insurance coverage status and sources of the coverage on a monthly level, so I
am able to determine if an individual and his or her spouse were covered by
ESI or not. This kind of information is unavailable in CPS. Another benefit
of SIPP compared to CPS is that SIPP follows interviewees over time so it is
possible to link young adults to their parents while the young adults that can
be linked to their parents in CPS are those who lives with their parents.
SIPP provides information on whether an individual separated from
their job in a given wave. If an individual starts a wave with one job, that
job is defined as the main job for that wave; if an individual starts a wave
with no jobs, the main job is defined as the first job that starts in that wave if
any; for those who start a wave with two jobs, the main job is defined as the
one with the higher monthly income.7 A job separation is considered to occur
in a certain wave only if the main job ends in that wave.8 To minimize the
data errors associated with respondents’ recollections and to avoid “sim bias”
(respondents provide very little unique information in each wave), I compress
the monthly level data into wave level data and use one observation per person
per wave. I use demographics in the beginning month of each wave and job
characteristics of the main job.
7When calculating the monthly income using hourly wage, I exclude those whose hourly
wage is above $100
8The job separation measure contains not only job-to-job transition, but also job-to-self-
employment, job-to-retirement, and job-to-unemployment transitions.
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I enforce several restrictions on the compressed data. North Dakota,
South Dakota, Vermont, and Maine were grouped together in 2001 and 2002,
so these observations are dropped. Hawaii is excluded from my sample since
Hawaii’s law requires employers to offer coverage to employees working at least
20 hours per week. I exclude public health insurance recipients, as they are
unlikely to be affected by the mandates. I also exclude recipients of Employer
Disability Payments and Social Security Income because they are likely to
be disabled and have different job attachment. Young adults who moved to
another state are dropped (less than 5% of the sample).
I restrict the sample to employed young adults aged 19-30 from years
2000 to 2010. The age cutoffs are chosen because 19 and 30 are the minimum
age and the maximum age that young adults can benefit from the state de-
pendent coverage mandates. The final sample consists of 324,028 observations,
with 236,507 individuals in the sample. Job lock and job push are analyzed
separately. For the analysis of job lock, I restrict the sample to 19 to 30-year-
olds who are employed and covered by own-name ESI. For the analysis of job
push, the sample is limited to 19 to 30-year-olds who are employed but not
covered by own-name ESI. The job lock sample has 130,682 observations, and
the job push sample has 172,368 observations.
The summary statistics are shown in Table 2. The overall job mobility
for employed 19 to 30-year-olds is 12.5%. About 42.5% of the sample gain
access to health insurance via their employer. Those without ESI (job push
sample) are approximately four times more likely to separate from their jobs
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than those with ESI (job lock sample). There are differences in demographics
and job characteristics between the job lock and job push samples. Those
who have ESI generally have higher wage, longer tenure, higher educational
attainment, and are more likely to be union members and have spouses with
ESI.
1.6 The State Mandates Analysis
1.6.1 Health Insurance Coverage
Prior to testing the impact of state dependent coverage mandates on
job mobility of young adults, I estimate how the law changes affect their health
insurance coverage status. It is important to note that the changes in health
insurance coverage is not necessarily the first stage results of the main analysis
on job mobility. The access to parental health insurance provided by the
mandates may just serve as a safety net to young adults; they do not need to
enroll in parental health insurance to switch jobs. However, since the mandates
are aimed at expanding dependent health insurance coverage, it is natural
to consider how effective the state mandates were in covering young adults.
Previous studies (Levine et al. 2011; Monheit et al. 2011; Depew 2015) found
that the reforms were effective in increasing the dependent health insurance
coverage rates with estimates ranging from 3% to 7%. They also found crowd-
out of other forms of health insurance coverage (e.g. own-name ESI, public
insurance). As a result, the impact on the insured rate is estimated to be small
in magnitude (0-3% increase).
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To study the impact of state dependent coverage mandates on young
adults’ health insurance coverage, I estimate five insurance coverage outcomes:
whether a young adult reports having any insurance coverage, ESI in own
name, dependent ESI9, private-purchased insurance coverage, and government
provided insurance coverage.10 I use the triple-difference identification strategy
and run regression equation (1.1) using the insurance coverage outcomes. The
results are reported in Table 3.
Each row of Table 3 represents a different insurance coverage outcome
variable. Results from column (1) are estimated using all young adults from
age 19 to 30 as the sample. I add demographic controls including sex, race,
age, education, marital status, indicator of having children, and indicator of
whether a spouse has ESI or not. No job characteristics controls are added.
The estimates from column (1) suggest that state reforms led to a 6% increase
in dependent coverage which is an 33% increase from the mean. The coverage
rate of young adults increased by 3%. There is a marginally significant 2%
drop in own-name ESI, while the private-purchased insurance coverage rate
and government provided insurance coverage rate did not drop significantly.
These estimates are consistent with prior studies. For column (2), I restrict the
sample to my job mobility analysis sample which is working young adults from
age 19 to 30.11 The results from column (2) are smaller in magnitude than
9In SIPP, spousal dependent ESI and parental dependent ESI are not separately identified
and they are grouped together as ESI in other’s name.
10Although the mandates also applied to parental private purchased insurance coverage, I
do not separately analyze own-name and other’s name private-purchased insurance coverage.
11Since my job mobility sample excludes recipients of public health insurance and benefits,
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those from column (1). I add additional job characteristic controls including
log hourly wage, tenure, union status, firm size, occupation, and industry in
column (3) which further reduced the estimates. It shows that job charac-
teristics are very important determinants of young adults’ health insurance
coverage status.
To address the attenuation bias caused by the exemption of self-insured
insurance plans, I add the percentage of people enrolled in full-insured insur-
ance plans and run regression equation (2) using insurance coverage outcome
variables. The results are reported in table 3 column (4). As expected, esti-
mates from column (4) are substantially larger than those from the previous
three columns. If all insurance plans are fully-insured, column (4) suggests
that access to parental health insurance raised the young adults’ probability
of dependent ESI coverage by 13.3% (more than 80% increase from the mean),
and the probability of any insurance coverage by 6.4%.
1.6.2 Overall Job Mobility, Job Lock, and Job Push
Next I explore how the job mobility of young adults is affected by the
state mandates. The triple-difference results from regression equation (1) are
shown in Table 4. Column (1) reports results on overall job mobility for all
young workers from age 19 to 30. It shows that state mandates led to a
insignificant and moderate decrease (0.4%) in the overall job mobility of the
I do not have estimates for government-provided health insurance coverage for column 2 to
column 4.
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targeted young workers. Job characteristics are very important determinants
of job separation. Individuals who hold jobs with higher wages, longer tenure,
and union status are less likely to separate from their jobs as expected. For
column (2) and column (3), I separate the sample according to whether young
workers have ESI in their own name or not. For those with own-name ESI,
they enter the job lock sample and their results are reported in column (2).
The results of the job push sample which consists of workers without own-
name ESI are shown in column (3). For the job lock sample, it is estimated
that the mandates led to a small increase (0.3%) in mobility, although it is
not statistically significant. For the job push sample, their probability of job
separation decreased significantly by 1% after the mandates became effective.
It can be translated into a 5.6% decrease from the mean. To address the
attenuation bias again, I add the percentage of people enrolled in full-insured
insurance plan and run regression equation (2) for the overall job mobility
sample, job lock sample, and job push sample. The results are reported in
table4 column (3). There is still a small and insignificant increase in the
mobility of the job lock sample. The estimates for the overall sample and the
job push sample tripled compare to the baseline results. If all insurance plans
are fully-insured, the mandates would lead to a 2.9% decrease in mobility of
workers without own-name ESI, which is roughly a 16% decrease compared to
the mean.
The main results suggest that the state mandates did not help with
the “job lock” problem of young adults that much. It is consistent with many
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previous studies that also found small and statistically insignificant job lock
effects (Kapur 1998, 2004; Stoupe et al. 2001; Sanz-de-Galdeano, 2006). It
could be that the state mandates were ineffective in reducing job lock, or
young adults have no severe job lock problem to begin with. Since I find
evidence of reduced job push among young adults and previous studies found
that the mandates did affect young adults’ labor market decisions, the second
case seems more likely. The previous legislative efforts including COBRA12
and HIPPA13 may have already eliminate a major part of job lock among
young adults, so that job lock among young adults is insubstantial before the
dependent coverage mandates is effective.
To ensure the robustness of my results, I estimate several additional
models.
First, I use voluntary and involuntary job separation as dependent vari-
ables instead of the overall job separation. SIPP asks respondents the reason
for leaving their jobs. I group job separations into voluntary separations and
involuntary separations according to the reasons provided.14 Because the key
argument of job lock and job push is that workers voluntarily stay in or seek
less well-matched jobs for the job-related benefits, the mandates are expected
12The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA) gives workers
and their family who lose ESI the right to continue the coverage for a limited period of time.
However, they may be required to pay for the entire premium for coverage.
13Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996(HIPAA) restricts the abil-
ity of group health plans to discriminate against preexisting conditions.
14I do not use voluntary job separation as my main dependent variable in the paper
because it is hard to separate voluntary and involuntary job separations. Also, the data
suffers from problems of measurement error and missing data.
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to only affect the voluntary job separation if the mandates affect job mobil-
ity by reducing job lock and job push. However, if the state mandates were
correlated with firms’ layoff decisions, I may find that the mandates affected
involuntary job separation. The results are presented in Table 5 panel b and
c. The estimates on voluntary job separation are similar compare to the base-
line results except that the estimate on job lock sample becomes larger and
significant. Compared to the results of voluntary job separation, the involun-
tary job separation estimates are a lot smaller in magnitude and less precisely
estimated. The point estimate on job lock sample has the wrong sign. These
results rule out the possibility that the baseline findings are driven by firm-side
responses instead of worker-side responses.
One concern of my findings is that the 2008 recession is driving the
results. Many states implemented law change around 2008 when the Great
Recession started. My results may be biased if the economic downturn hits the
eligible and ineligible young adults differently. To address this concern, I run
the same baseline regression again but exclude recession years. To be specific,
I re-estimate using data from the years 2000 to 2007. The results presented
in Table 5 panel d are generally similar to the baseline results except that the
sign of the job lock sample estimate changes to negative. The results suggest
that my main finding that the state dependent coverage mandates reduced job
push of young adults is not driven by the economic downturn.
Another potential problem that may bias my results relates to the way
I separate my sample into job lock sample and job push sample. I separate my
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sample according to whether young adults have own-name ESI or not, but the
ESI status is affected by the state dependent coverage mandates. According
to the health insurance coverage results from table 3, the mandates led to
a relatively small change (5% drop compare to the mean) in the own-name
ESI coverage, and it is marginally significant. I expect the problem to be not
severe enough to drive the results. Nevertheless, I run a test to further address
the concern. Instead of using contemporary ESI coverage status, I separate
individuals by their pre-mandate ESI status which should be unaffected by the
mandates. However, by doing this I have to drop individuals who do not have
pre-mandate information, which cut down my sample size significantly. The
results presented in table 5 panel e are similar in magnitude compared to the
baseline results. The standard errors are bigger because my sample size is cut
smaller. Generally, it does not appear that the endogeneity of ESI coverage is
a serious problem I need to worry about.
The validity of the results depends on the identification assumption
of the triple-difference that the state mandates are exogenous, and there are
no contemporaneous shocks at the eligible-state-year level that affect the job
mobility of eligible young adults. I provide two falsification tests to check the
validity of the identification strategy. First, I present the results restricting the
sample to older young adults who are not eligible for the mandates because of
age. Since they cannot benefit from the law changes, I expect no impact of the
state reforms on their overall job mobility, job lock, and job push. Second, I re-
estimate the main regression with placebo mandates. Specifically, I randomly
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assign the dates that states implemented the dependent coverage mandates.
If the triple-difference identification strategy is valid, the placebo estimates
should be centered on zero because there should be no effect in periods that
do not indicate a treatment change.
Table 6 shows the results for the two falsification tests. The results for
the older cohort sample are reported in panel b. Panel c reports the estimates
of the placebo mandates. None of the estimates of the two falsification tests
are statistically different from zero. The point estimates are all substantially
smaller compared to the baseline results. The signs of the estimates using
placebo mandates are all in the opposite direction. Based on the results for
the two falsification tests, there seems to be no obvious biases that could be
driving the main findings.
1.7 Conclusion
Understanding the interaction between health insurance coverage and
labor market decisions is very important especially for young adults, because
they are often uninsured and the job matches at early periods of career may
have a significant impact on later career trajectories. However, little is known
about the extent to which ESI has affected young adults’ labor market deci-
sions. This paper fills this gap by studying the impact of arguably exogenous
insurance policy reforms on the job mobility of young adults. The expanded
dependent coverage mandate, which provides parental health insurance access
to young adults, may increase the job mobility of workers with ESI if they are
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“locked” into their current job for fear of losing ESI. The mandate could also
decrease the job mobility of workers without ESI if they are “pushed” out of
their current job in search of jobs with ESI. I test these hypotheses using both
state and federal policy variations. Results provide consistent and robust evi-
dence that expanded dependent coverage mandate alleviated job push among
workers without ESI. I find that the state mandates led to a 5% reduction
in job turnover for workers without ESI. Despite the popular belief that the
ACA cures job lock, I find no evidence of reduced job lock. Results show no
evidence that the mandate caused young workers with ESI to be more likely
to leave their jobs. It could be because young adults have relatively less acute
job lock to begin with, and the previous legislative efforts including COBRA
(1985) and HIPPA (1996) may have already eliminated a major part of job
lock among young adults.
This chapter finds that the dependent coverage mandate caused young
workers to be more willing to stay at an uninsured job, which is consistent
with prior literatures that found the dependent coverage mandate reduced the
young adults’ working hours and their probability of being full-time workers,
because part-time jobs are usually uninsured. These findings suggest that
some young adults are better matched for part-time jobs or self-employment,
so that they have time to pursue other interests such as school training. Future
research on the long run impact of the reforms on young adults’ labor market
outcomes and educational attainment would provide further insight into the
value of reduced job push. Future study could also extend the analysis to the
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secondary effect on parents’ job mobility.
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Chapter 2
The Affordable Care Act Dependent Coverage
Mandate and the Job Mobility of Young
Adults
2.1 Introduction
The ACA Dependent Coverage Mandate was passed on March 23rd,
2010, and became effective on September 23, 2010. The mandate requires
that health insurance plans that provide dependent coverage must cover de-
pendents until the age of 26. Insurers can not charge higher premiums for
eligible young adults or offer fewer benefits than they do for younger depen-
dents. By extending the age limit that dependents can stay on parents’ plan,
the law makes health insurance coverage more affordable and accessible for
young adults. Prior to the federal mandate, employer sponsored health insur-
ance plans (ESI) in states without similar state-level mandates generally stop
dependent coverage at age age 19 or age 23 if the dependents are enrolled full-
time in school. Under the federal mandate, young adults can join or remain on
parents’ plan until 26’s birthday even if they are married, have a child, do not
attending school, do not living with their parents, are financially independent
on their parents, or eligible for their employer’s plan.
The ACA Dependent Coverage Mandate, similar to the prior state-
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level dependent coverage mandates, could affect young adults’ job mobility. It
could reduce “job lock” and increase the job mobility of those with ESI and are
“locked” in their job for fear of losing ESI. On the other hand, it could reduce
“job push” and decrease the job mobility of those with no ESI and are “pushed”
out of their jobs into jobs that provide ESI. Compare to the state mandates
that were implemented in different states at different time, the federal mandate
was implemented on September 23, 2010 for all states. Although the federal
mandate provides less policy variation, it is still important to study how the
job turnover responded toward the ACA dependent coverage mandate, because
federal and state laws are different in many aspects. First, state laws are
weaker than the federal mandate. State mandates usually have lower eligible
age limits than the federal mandate. Also, State laws have other restrictions
besides age, while age is the only requirement under ACA. Most importantly,
state mandates does not apply to self-insured workers who count for more than
half of all private sector workers. Second, because of the simple rule and wide
publicity of ACA provisions, the federal mandate seems to be better enforced
and understood by eligible families than state mandates1. These differences
suggest that the impact of the federal mandate should be bigger than the state
mandates.
In this chapter, I focus on the ACA Dependent Coverage Mandate,
and supplement my first chapter by studying the impact of federal mandate
on both the “job lock” and “job push” of young adults. Using Survey of Income
1Cantor, Belloff, Monheit, Delia, and Koller (2012)
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and Program Participation (SIPP) data from 2008 to 2013, the impact of the
ACA Dependent Coverage Mandate on young adults’ job mobility is identified
by both difference-in-difference (DD) framework and regression discontinuity
(RD) design. The DD approach compares the job mobility among the treated
group who gained access to parental health insurance to the control group that
is ineligible for the benefit, before and after the effective date of the mandate.
The RD approach exploits the law’s arbitrary cutoff age (age 26) and compares
the job mobility of young adults who are just above and just below age 26.
The results are generally consistent with those from the first chapter: both DD
and RD find that the federal mandate alleviated “job push” among workers
without ESI and no evidence of reduced “job lock” among workers with ESI.
The estimated effect of the ACA mandate is larger in magnitude than the
estimated effect of the state mandates from the first chapter, which suggest
that the federal mandate is more effective than the state mandates. This is
largely due to the fact that approximately half of the insurance plans (self-
insured insurance plans) are exempt from state mandates but subject to the
federal mandate.
This chapter unfolds as follows. The next section outlines the DD and
RD regression frameworks. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents
and discusses the estimates of the ACA mandate analysis, and compares them
with those from the state mandates analysis in the first chapter. Section 5
concludes.
31
2.2 Empirical Approaches
The ACA Dependent Coverage Mandate was implemented in Septem-
ber 2010 which applies to all young adults below the age of 26, as long as their
parents have insurance plans that cover dependents. I use two empirical strate-
gies to identify the effect of the ACA dependent coverage mandate on young
adults’ job mobility. First, it is natural to think of a difference-in-difference
strategy that compares the job mobility of 19 to 25-year-olds before and after
the ACA mandate and uses a slightly older age cohort (27 to 30-years-olds) as
the control group. This is the dominant strategy used in the previous literature
on the ACA dependent coverage mandate. However, Slusky (2013)criticized
the overly broad control (27 to 30-year-olds) and treated groups (19 to 25-
year-olds). They may be affected by different labor market shocks and thus
do not share the same trend which violates the validity of a DD strategy. As
suggested in Slusky(2013), I use narrower age groups where parallel trends
assumption becomes less of a concern. Specifically, I compare the overall job
mobility, job lock, and job push of the treated group (24 to 25-year-olds) to the
control group (26 to 28-year-olds) before and after September 2010. I estimate
the following regression:
Yit = Φ(α+β1Treatit×Postit+β2Treatit+β3Postit+β4Xist+θs+γt+εit) (2.1)
Where Treatit takes value one if individual i is younger than 26 years
old (24 or 25 years old) at time t and takes value zero if older (26-28 years
old). Postit is a dummy variable that equals to one if wave t is after the
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implementation date of the ACA mandate which is September 2010. The
coefficient of interest is β1, which is the estimated effect of the federal reform on
the job mobility of eligible young adults. Similar to the first chapter equation
(1.1), I add demographic controls including sex, race, age, education, marital
status, and indicator of having children, as well as Job characteristics including
log hourly wage, job tenure, union status, firm size, occupation, and industry. I
also control for whether the spouse has ESI or not, as well as state and month
fixed effect. I separately analyze job lock and job push by restricting the
sample to job lock sample and job push sample described in the first chapter
data section.
Second, I consider a regression discontinuity (RD) framework. The
ACA dependent coverage mandate requires insurance plans to cover young
adults’ until their 26th birthday. Eligibility for the benefit is delineated by
age. The cutoff age of 26 is arbitrary. Young adults just below and just above
age 26 are very similar except that those who are above age 26 no longer
have access to their parents’ insurance plans. SIPP contains information on
individual birth month which can be used to accurately determine whether the
young adults are above or below the age of 26. The effect of ACA mandate on
job mobility is identified by comparing the job mobility of young adults just
below and just above age 26.
I exploit a parametric RD design. I restrict my sample to 24 to 28-year-
olds in the post ACA period (2011-2013) and estimate the following equation:
Yit = α + β1Post26it + β2f(mit) + β3Xit + εit (2.2)
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Where POST26it equals to one if the individual i’s age is above 26 years old.
f(mit) is a smooth function with respect to age in months. For the functional
form of f(mi), I start with six candidates (linear, linear interaction, quadratic,
quadratic interaction, cubic, cubic interaction) and use the F-test approach
suggested in Lee and Lemieux (2010) to find specification that fits the data
best. Regression (4) are estimated both with and without controls Xist are
controls defined similarly as in equation (2.1). Standard errors are clustered
by age. The coefficient of interest is β1, which measures the discontinuity in
job mobility at age 26.
2.3 Data
This chapter’s data comes from the 2008 panel of the Survey of Income
and Program Participation from years 2008 to 2013. I handle the data in a
way similar to the one described in the data section of the first chapter (More
information can be found in Appendix). I compress the monthly level data
into wave level (a 4-month period) data and use one observation per person per
wave. For respondents in each wave, I observe their demographics, their main
jobs’ characteristics at the beginning of the wave, and whether their main jobs
end during that wave. I enforce similar restrictions to the sample: I exclude
Hawaii, North DAkora, South Dakota, Vermont, and Maine; I exclude public
health insurance recipients, and recipients of Employer Disability Payments
and Social Security Income; I also exclude those who moved to another state
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2.
The sample is restricted to employed young adults aged 24-28 from
years 2008 to 2013. Job lock and job push sub-samples are again analyzed
separately. For the analysis of job lock, I restrict the sample to young adults
who are employed and covered by own-name ESI. For the analysis of job push,
the sample is limited to those who are employed but not covered by own-name
ESI.
Table 7 shows the summary statistics for both job lock and job push
sub-samples, as well as the whole sample. The overall job mobility for em-
ployed young adults aged 24 to 28 from 2008 to 2013 is 8.6%. About 34.8% of
the overall sample have ESI. The job turnover of the job push sample is much
larger than the job turnover of those with ESI (job lock sample). When com-
pare the demographics and job characteristics of the two sub samples, those
without ESI generally have lower wage, longer tenure, higher educational at-
tainment, and are less likely to be union members and have spouses with ESI.
2.4 The ACA Dependent Coverage Mandate Analysis
2.4.1 Difference-in-Difference Strategy
2.4.1.1 Health Insurance Coverage
First, I estimate how the federal young adults’ health insurance cov-
erage status and examine how effective the federal mandate was in covering
2Less than 5% of the sample is dropped.
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young adults. I run regression equation (2.1) using insurance coverage out-
comes as dependent variables. The DD results for five insurance coverage
outcomes are reported in Table 8. The column (1) are estimates for all young
adults age 24 to 28. Similarly to the state mandates analysis, the ACA man-
date led to a 4.8% increase in coverage rate for 24 to 25-year-olds, compared to
the 26 to 28-year-olds, after conditioning on individual characteristics. Esti-
mates from column (1) also show a 9.6% increase in parental insurance coverage
(which represents a 80% increase compared to the mean), and a 4.8% reduc-
tion in own-name ESI. These estimates are similar in magnitude to estimates
from prior papers that studies the impact of the ACA dependent coverage
mandate on health insurance coverage of young adults (Antwi et al., 2013;
Cantor et al. 2012b). I restrict the sample to working young adults from age
24-28 in column (2), and I add additional job controls in column (3). The esti-
mates do not change much compared to column (1) except for the estimate on
private-purchased insurance coverage which becomes smaller and insignificant.
Column (4) is the state baseline results from Table 3 column (3). Generally,
the ACA mandate estimates are twice as big as the state mandates estimates,
which makes sense because about half of the insurance plans (self-insured in-
surance plans) are exempt from state mandates but are subject to the ACA
mandate.
To present the difference-in-difference research design graphically, I plot
the coefficients from the regression that interact the year dummies with the
treatment variable which is the indicator of below 26 years old. The coefficient
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for year 2009 is normalized to zero, so the estimates can be interpreted as
health insurance coverage changes relative to year 2009. This allows me to
inspect pre-trends, and also observe how the treatment effect varies overtime.
Figure 1 shows that the coefficients of lead year are close to zero for all the
four insurance coverage outcomes. The treatment effects increase over time
on three insurance coverage variables: insurance coverage from any source,
parental ESI, and own-name ESI.
2.4.1.2 Overall Job Mobility, Job Lock, and Job Push
Table 9 column (1) and (2) presents the DD estimates on the job mo-
bility of the overall sample, the job lock sample, and the job push sample.
I only control for individual demographics in column (1). Estimates show a
decrease in the overall job mobility of young adults. This estimate is similar
in magnitude to the treatment effect estimated by Baily (2015) who uses CPS
and a similar research design and controls. Column (1) also shows an insignif-
icant decrease in job mobility of the job lock sample and the job push sample.
When controlling for additional job characteristics including log hourly wage,
tenure, union status, firm size, occupation, and industry, the estimates be-
come larger and are estimated more precisely. The coefficient on the job push
sample increases to 1.5%, which represents a 10% reduction from the mean.
These results show that job characteristics are very important determinants of
young adults’ mobility. Controlling for job characteristics allows me to isolate
the effect of parental insurance on job mobility. Column (5) is the same as
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Table 4 column (2) which reports the state results. If I compare the percentage
changes instead of absolute changes, the federal estimates are again roughly
twice as big as the state mandates estimates. For example, the state analysis
estimates a 5% decrease in the job push sample while the federal estimate is
10%. To inspect the pre-trends and post-trends, I plot the leads and lags of
the treatment effect in Figure 2. It shows that the treatment effects seem to
fade away over time for all three graphs.
2.4.2 Regression Discontinuity Framework
2.4.2.1 Health Insurance Coverage
I plot the age profiles for four health insurance coverage outcomes in
Figure 3. The dots are the mean values of health insurance coverage outcomes
by age in months. The horizontal line measures the difference between cutoff
age (age 26) and actual age in months. The figure shows a break in trend at the
cutoff age for the parental ESI. The age profile of the parental ESI decreases
continuously before age 26, at which point it experiences a drop, then stays
flat after age 26. The age profiles for other health insurance coverage outcomes
do not show obvious trend breaks.
I quantify the discontinuities using parametric RD. The optimal spec-
ification for the smooth age function is the quadratic polynomial function
with interaction which is chosen by the F-test approach suggested in Lee and
Lemieux (2010). The results are presented in Table 10 panel a. Estimates from
column (1) do not control for demographics and job characteristics while col-
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umn (2) adds those controls. When aging out of the parental health insurance
at the age of 26, young adults experience a 4% decrease in the probability of
having parental ESI. The insured rate decrease while the probability of having
own-name ESI and private-purchased health insurance increases at age 26, but
the coefficients are not statistically distinguishable from zero. I run a falsifica-
tion test which I re-estimate the discontinuity at age 26 using the pre-mandate
period from September 2008 to September 2010. The results are presented in
Table 10 panel a column (3). All the estimates from column(3) are relatively
smaller and statistically insignificant. The signs on health insurance from any
source and own-name ESI are in the opposite direction. The results from the
falsification test show that there are no breaks in health insurance coverage
trends at age 26 during the pre-mandate period.
2.4.2.2 Overall Job Mobility, Job Lock, and Job Push
Figure 4 shows the age profiles for the job mobility of the overall sample,
the job lock sample, and the job push sample. The dots are the average job
separation rate for each age in months. The age profiles for the overall job
mobility and the job mobility of the job push sample show breaks in trends
at cutoff age, while the job mobility of the job lock sample appears to trend
smoothly at age 26.
The parametric estimates are reported in Table 10 panel b. The overall
job mobility increases by 2% at age 26, but the estimate becomes smaller and
insignificant when adding demographic and job controls. Similar to figure 4,
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the job separation rate for workers with ESI (job lock) shows no break at the
cutoff age. The probability of leaving jobs for workers without ESI increases
by 3.3% at age 26 when they lose access to parental ESI. The estimate reduces
to 2.7% with controls. When using the pre-mandate period data, the estimates
are all statistically insignificant, indicating that there are no breaks in the job
mobility trend at age 26 during the pre-mandate period.
The estimated job push effect using RD is larger in magnitude than
the reduced job push estimated using DD in the previous section. It may
be inappropriate to compare the RD results with the DD results and the
state DDD results directly because RD estimates the effect of losing access
to insurance while DD and DDD estimates the effect of gaining access to
insurance. However, the RD results provide supporting evidence to my main
findings that the ACA dependent coverage mandate does influence the job
mobility of young adults especially those without ESI.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter supplements the state mandates analysis from the first
chapter with the ACA Dependent Coverage Mandate analysis. The ACA De-
pendent Coverage Mandate extend the dependent coverage to young adults
under the age of 26. Using SIPP 2008-2013 data, the impact of the ACA man-
date on young adults’ job mobility is identified by DD regression framework
and RD design. This chapter again shows the importance of health insurance
in the labor market decisions of young adults. I find consistent evidence of
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reduced job push and no evidence of reduced job lock. The estimated reduced
job push is larger than the estimates from the state mandates analysis in the
first chapter. The results from the DD regression framework show that the
ACA mandate led to a 1.46% decrease (10% reduction from the mean) in the
job mobility of young adults without ESI. The results from the RD design
show that the job mobility of workers without ESI increased by 2.7% at age
26 when they lost access to dependent health insurance.
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Chapter 3
The ACA Medicaid Expansion and the Job
Mobility of Childless Adults
3.1 Introduction
The United States has a unique health insurance system that relies
heavily on employer-sponsored health insurance. Public health insurance pro-
grams such as Medicaid and Medicare, cover the most vulnerable population
including children, pregnant women, the disabled, low-income parents, and el-
derly individuals. Other groups of the population including low-income child-
less adults, however, are historically excluded from the public insurance pro-
grams, and they can only gain access to affordable insurance coverage through
their work.
The close link between health insurance coverage and employment could
have important implications on workers’ job mobility. Workers may value the
employer-sponsored health insurance more than the wage (or utility) differen-
tial between comparable jobs, so they may bypass alternative better-matched
jobs and find themselves “locked” into less-preferred jobs by the need to main-
tain their current health insurance, a phenomenon referred to as “job lock”. In
addition to job switching decisions, the restriction on insurance access could
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also affect workers’ decision to retire, and leave the labor force. This is referred
to as “employment lock”, which occurs when workers stay employed primarily
to secure employer-sponsored health insurance.
The Affordable Care Act (ACA), one of the most sweeping health care
reforms in the United States, was designed, among other things, to increase the
availability of affordable health insurance and thus loosened the tie between
health insurance and employment. The ACA was enacted in March 2010,
and most of its provisions took effect on January 1, 2014. The Medicaid
expansion is one of the key components of the ACA that expands Medicaid
eligibility to include individuals and families with incomes up to 138% of the
Federal Poverty Line (FPL)1. The ACA Medicaid expansion has the greatest
impact on non-disabled, non-elderly, civilian adults who do not have children
under the age of 19, because they were previous excluded from the public
health insurance programs. The implementation of the Medicaid expansion
was challenged by the United States Supreme Court ruling in 2012 that enabled
states to opt out of the expansion. As of March 2017, 32 states (including the
District of Columbia) adopted the expansion while 19 states opted out2.
The ACA Medicaid expansion provides a unique policy change that
can be used to analyze the impact of public health insurance on job mobil-
1The text of the ACA states the new threshold is 133% of the federal poverty level.
However, a new method of income calculation (MAGI, Modified Adjusted Gross Income)
was adopted under the ACA, which allows for a 5% “income disregard”, changing the
effective income threshold to 138% of the federal poverty level.
2Source: Current Status of State Medicaid Expansion Decisions 2017, the Henry J. Kaiser
Family Foundation.
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ity of childless adults. Previous literature on the relationship between health
insurance and job mobility is inconclusive. Some studies find large job lock
effects (e.g., Madrian (1994) find workers without spousal insurance access
are 15-25% less likely to leave their jobs), some find moderate effects in cer-
tain population groups (e.g., Hamersma and Kim (2009) find that Medicaid
eligibility increased job turnover among unmarried women), and others find
no evidence of job lock effect (e.g., Holtz-Eakin, 1994; Kapur, 1997; Sanz-
De-Galdeano, 2006). Another strand of the literature studies the impact of
public health insurance on labor market outcomes which is an indirect way
of studying “employment lock”. The results are mixed too. Some studies
find that the Medicaid eligibility reduced the labor supply of single mothers,
pregnant women, and childless adults (e.g., Dave et al., 2015; Dague, DeLeire,
and Leininger, 2014; Garthwaite, Gross, and Notowidigdo, 2014; Kim, 2016).
However, many papers that study the recent Medicaid expansion find no effect
on labor supply (e.g., Leung and Mas, 2016; Kaestner et al., 2016; Duggan,
Goda, and Jackson, 2016; Frisvold and Jung, 2016).
This chapter contributes to this debate by analyzing the impact of the
ACA Medicaid expansion on the job mobility of childless adults. The reform
may increase the job mobility of workers if they are “locked” into their job
(“job lock” or “employment lock”) to secure their employer-sponsored health
insurance. To test this hypothesis, this paper utilizes the basic monthly Cur-
rent Population Survey (CPS) data from January 2011 to December 2016 and
performs a longitudinal matching to construct two panels and get respondents’
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job change profiles over 4 months and 8 months3. The impact of the expansion
on the childless adults’ job turnover is identified by a difference-in-difference
(DD) strategy that exploits the state-time level of variations in Medicaid eli-
gibility. To be specific, I compare the job separation rate of childless adults in
expansion states to those residing in non-expansion states, before and after the
expansions. To further understand job transitions and to differentiate between
“job lock” and “employment lock”, I separate the event of job transition into
4 scenarios according to the employment status after job separation: transi-
tion to full-time job, transition to part-time job, transition to unemployment,
and transition to leaving the labor force. I estimated the probability changes
of each scenario compared to the probability of staying at one’s job using a
multinomial logit regression.
The results show that gaining access to Medicaid coverage increased
childless adults’ job mobility. I provide evidence that the ACA Medicaid ex-
pansion led to a 0.32% increase (or 7.2% increase from the mean of 4.47%) in
the job mobility over 4-month period and a 0.73% increase (or 9.7% increase
from the mean of 7.52%) in the job mobility over 8 interview months. Sub-
group analysis shows that the health reform had a larger impact on childless
adults who are white, above 50 years old, or less educated (high school or less).
In addition, I show that the increased job mobility is a result of an increase
in job-to-job transition which suggest the existence of the “job lock” effect. I
3This is not 8 consecutive months, but 4 months data + 8 months break + 4 months
data. See data section.
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find no evidence of the “employment lock” effect. Results show no evidence
that childless adults are more likely to become unemployed or leave the labor
force when eligible for the Medicaid.
This chapter contributes to the existing literature in a number of ways.
First, this is the first study to directly analyze the impact of the recent Med-
icaid expansion on childless adults’ job mobility. Previous papers focus on
women and parents who were beneficiaries of Medicaid before the recent Med-
icaid expansions. They have looked at parental Medicaid expansion and par-
ents’ job mobility (e.g., Hamersma and Kim, 2009), Medicaid expansion (in the
1980s and 1990s) and women’s job mobility - especially that of pregnant women
(e.g., Dave et al., 2015), State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP)
expansion and working parents’ job mobility (e.g., Bansak and Raphael, 2008).
Prior research on the ACA Medicaid expansion focuses on childless adults’ la-
bor supply. They examine whether the expansion reduced “employment lock”
among childless adults by studying the employment effects from the expan-
sion. Their method is an indirect way of detecting “employment lock”. Also,
it cannot be used to study the “job lock”, because job-to-job transitions do
not affect employment status. This paper studies both the “employment lock”
and “job lock” by looking directly at the event of job separation and different
types of job transitions.
Second, this chapter focuses on childless adults which are less studied
but of great interest to policymakers who are still debating the future of the
Medicaid program because childless adults are the major beneficiaries of the
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recent Medicaid expansion. This paper contributes to the understanding of the
interaction between public health insurance and childless adults’ labor market
decisions.
Last but not least, in this study I am able to utilize the basic monthly
CPS that covers the period between January 2011 to December 2016. The
data set contains more recent data after the ACA Medicaid expansion in 2014
compared to previous literature that studies the expansion. The data set
also covers the most recent adopting states including the Louisiana Medicaid
expansion in June 2016. Late adopting states are often ignored in previous
literature due to data availability. The varying adopting dates of different
expansion states provide variation that helps identify the effect of the policy
change.
This chapter is organized as follows. The next section provides the
background of the ACA Medicaid expansion. Section 3 describes the data.
Section 4 outlines regression frameworks. Section 5 presents and discusses the
results. Section 6 concludes.
3.2 Background
3.2.1 Medicaid
Medicaid has been the largest public health insurance program for low-
income individuals and families in the United States since its enactment in
1965. It is a joint federal-state program to assist states in providing health
insurance to low-income individuals and families. The federal government
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establishes broad guidelines, and the states Medicaid programs vary as long
as they meet the guidelines. This program is mean-tested and the premium
and cost-sharing is set to be zero or very low to protect the most vulnerable
residents whose resources are insufficient to meet the necessary medical services
costs. Prior to the ACA Medicaid expansion, Medicaid covered 55 million
Americans, most of which are children, pregnant women, parents of eligible
children, disabled individuals, and elderly people (the Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services, 2013).
3.2.2 The ACA Medicaid Expansion
The ACA significantly expanded Medicaid eligibility. The ACA was
passed on March 23rd, 2010 with the goal of increasing health insurance cov-
erage. One of the key provisions of the ACA is Medicaid expansion. Under
the ACA, starting in January 2014 Medicaid is set to expand the eligibility
to include individuals and families with incomes up to 138% of the federal
poverty level. Prior to the ACA Medicaid expansion, states granted Medicaid
eligibility to certain categories of low-income individuals, including children,
pregnant women, parents of eligible children, the disabled, and elderly. States
varied in both the definition of low-income categories and the income thresh-
olds for each category. Usually the cutoffs were lower than the new eligible
threshold (138% FPL)4. Non-elderly non-disabled adults without dependent
4Before the ACA, the federal government mandated that the minimum eligibility thresh-
olds for children and pregnant women be be 100-133% FPL. The eligibility thresholds for
parents were generally less than 100% FPL.
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children did not fall into the Medicaid eligibility categories in most of the
states5. The health care reform eliminates the eligible categories by expand-
ing the minimum income eligibility threshold to 138% FPL for everyone which
means that childless adults are no longer excluded from the program.
In 2012, the Supreme Court ruled that states have the option to con-
tinue at their pre-ACA levels of Medicaid eligibility. Figure 5 represents the
states’ decisions as of December 2016. A total 32 states adopted the expansion
while 19 states opted out. Table 11 displays each state’s expansion decision,
expansion timing, and eligibility thresholds for childless adults before and af-
ter the expansion. 25 states decided to move forward with the expansion
starting from January 20146. As of December 2016, 7 states adopted the Med-
icaid expansion in accordance with the ACA after Januaray 20147. A total
number of 19 states have opted out of the expansion8. 31 out of the 32 expan-
sion states raised the income eligibility threshold for childless adults to 138%.
Only the District of Columbia has a higher threshold (215%). For all the 19
non-expansion states except Wisconsin, childless adults remain ineligible for
Medicaid. Wisconsin did not adopt the expansion but amended the Section
1115 waiver to cover adults up to 100% FPL in Januray 2014. It is worth not-
ing that 9 early adopting states provided coverage to childless adults before
5In 2009, five states (AZ, DE, HI, NY, VT) provided coverage to childless adults with
state-only dollars or under special Medicaid waivers (Kaiser Family Foundation 2009)
6These states are AZ, AR, CA, CO, CT, DE, DC, HI, IL, IA, KY, MD, MA, MN, NE,
NJ, NM, NY, ND, OH, OR, RI, VT, WA, WV.
7These states are AK, IN, LA, MI, MT, NH, PA.
8These states are AL, FL, GA, ID, KS, ME, MS, MO, NE, NC, OK, SC, SD, TN, TX,
UT, VA, WI, WY.
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January 2014 through Section 1115 waivers, but the programs were generally
less comprehensive than the full Medicaid9. Because the increases in income
eligibility thresholds were smaller or zero in these early adopting states in
January 2014 compared to other expansion states, I exclude them from the
treated state group.
The total Medicaid enrollment grew rapidly in recent years after the im-
plementation of Medicaid expansion. The Medicaid enrollment raised 13.2% in
2015 and 3.9% in 2016 (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2016). The total Medicaid
spending raised 10.5% in 2015 and 5.9% in 2016 (Kaiser Family Foundation,
2016). As of December 2016, nealy 70.5 million Americans were enrolled in
Medicaid (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2016). Figure 6 presents the Medicaid
coverage trends among childless adults in expansion states and non-expansion
states. The Medicaid coverage data are from the CPS March Supplement. The
childless adults’ Medicaid coverage in expansion states raised significantly after
2014, while the growth in non-expansion states is relatively constant.
3.3 Data
The data used in this paper comes from the basic monthly files of the
Current Population Survey (CPS) from January 2011 to December 2016. The
CPS is a national representative survey of about 60,000 U.S. households con-
ducted monthly by the Census Bureau. It is the primary source of monthly
9These states are AZ, CO, CT, DE, DC, HI, MN, NY, VT.
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labor force statistics in the United States, and it also collects information on
individual demographics, education, and earnings. The basic monthly CPS
is chosen for this study because it is the most up-to-date data source that
contains information on job mobility. My sample period which is from Jan-
uary 2011 to December 2016 covers the most recent Medicaid expansions by
late adopting states in 201610, and has 3 years of observation after the main
Medicaid expansion happened in January 2014.
Although the CPS is designed to be a cross-sectional survey, it has a
longitudinal structure. Selected households are divided into rotation groups
and they are interviewed on a rotation basis. Each group is interviewed for 4
consecutive months, put on hold for 8 months, and then followed by another
4 consecutive months of interviews before dropped out of the sample. Thus,
each household has in total 8 months of observations. Each month, one rota-
tion group that finished all the interviews is dropped out of the sample, and
a new rotation group is added. In any given month, 8 rotation groups are
interviewed. This panel aspect of the CPS is rarely exploited in the previous
literature because it is a relatively short panel, and matching individuals from
different interview months is complicated by migration, mortality, and coding
errors. However, it is important to utilize the panel structure of the CPS to
study job mobility and job transitions. Following Madrian and Lefgren (1999),
I perform a longitudinal matching using household and person identifiers, and
10Montana adopted the Medicaid expansion on January 1, 2016, and Louisiana adopted
the Medicaid expansion on June 1, 2016.
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validate the match using individual sex, age, and race. Individuals with miss-
ing interviews are dropped out of the sample. When I consider only the first
4 interviews, about 85% of the individuals are matched. When looking over
the 8-months interviews, the match rate dropped to 70%. Thus, I have two
matched samples, one is a 4-month sample, and the other is a 8-month sample.
The basic monthly CPS contains information on job mobility. In each
of the interview months 2-4 and 6-8, the individual is asked the following
question: “Last month, it was reported that you worked for (employer name).
Do you still work for (employer name)?” The respondent can answer “Yes” or
“No” to this question. Since the job mobility question is not asked in interview
month 5, I don’t observe if job separation occurs during the 8 months break
(between interview month 4 and 5). For the 4-month panel, job separation
is considered to occur if the respondent answered “No” at least once during
the 4-months period. Instead of using all 4-months observations, I only keep
respondents’ demographics together with whether job separation occurs during
the 4-months period, and employment statuses and job characteristics at the
beginning (interview month 1) and at the end (interview month 4) of the panel.
Similarly, for the 8-month panel, job separation is considered to occur if the
respondent answered “No” at least once during the 8-month period11. I keep
respondents’ demographics, the job separation indicator for the 8 months, and
their employment statuses and job characteristics in interview months 1 and
8.
11The job mobility question is asked in interview months 2-4 and 6-8.
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This paper focuses on childless adults who are most affected by the
ACA Medicaid expansion. The sample consists of non-disabled adults who
are employed and do not have children under age 19. As mentioned in the
background section, 9 early adopting states (AZ, CO, CT, DE, DC, HI, MN,
NY, VT) provided limited benefits to childless adults before the ACA Medicaid
expansion in January 2014. I exclude those 9 states from the sample. Since
one of the non-expansion state, Wisconsin, started covering childless adults up
to 100% FPL in January 2014, it is also treated as an expansion states. Thus,
I have 23 treated states and 18 control states left in the sample. I further
restrict my sample to non-institutionalized, civilian adults between ages 26
and 64, because young adults under the age of 26 could receive dependent
coverage, and elderly adults aged 65 and above qualify for Medicare.
Table 12 presents the descriptive statistics of the 4-month sample for
both expansion states and non-expansion states, before and after the expan-
sions. The similar descriptive statistics of the 8-month sample are presented
in Table 13. For the 4-month sample, childless adults’ average job separation
rate over 4 months is about 4% - 5%. Non-expansion states had higher job sep-
aration than expansion states prior to the expansion, but the difference disap-
peared after the expansion. There are some demographic differences between
expansion states and non-expansion states. For example, expansion states
have more college educated residents and less high school dropouts. These dif-
ferences are small and relatively consistent before and after the expansion. I
add two state time-varying characteristics, state monthly seasonally-adjusted
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unemployment rate obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and state
quarterly per capita personal income growth obtained from the Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis. The expansion states generally have high unemployment rate
and high income per capita change. The downward trend of unemployment
and upward trend of income per capita change are observed for both expansion
and non-expansion states before and after the expansion. The 8-month sample
statistics are similar to the 4-month ones except that the job separation rate
is about 7%-8%, which is almost twice the size of the 4-month sample.
3.4 Empirical Strategy
The ACA Medicaid expansions provide state by time variation in Med-
icaid eligibility which allow for a difference-in-difference (DD) identification
strategy. I compare the job mobility of childless adults in expansion states
before and after the expansion, and control for the same difference in the job
mobility of childless adults in non-expansion states.
I estimate the impact of the ACA Medicaid expansions on the job
mobility of childless adults using the following probit regression for individual
i in state s at time t (month).
Separatedist = Φ(α+β1(Postst×Expansions)+β2Xist+β3λst+θs+γt+εist)
(3.1)
In the above regression specification, Φ(.) is a standard cumulative nor-
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mal distribution function. Probit regression is chosen because the dependent
variable is binary, and also because it is the dominant strategy used in the
previous literature on job mobility. Separatedist is a dummy variable for job
separation. For the 4-month sample, Separatedist equals one if individual i
separated from his or her job during the first 4 consecutive months of inter-
views, and equals zero if individual i stayed at that job. Separatedist is defined
similarly for the 8-month sample, except that the period is longer (including
both the first 4 months and the last 4 months of interviews)12. Expansions
is an indicator of whether the state is an expansion state. Expansion states
are states that adopted the ACA Medicaid expansion after January 2014 (9
early adopting states dropped) plus the state of Wisconsin. Postst takes value
1 after the expansion, and 0 before the expansion. Out of 23 treated states,
16 states expanded Medicaid in January 2014, and 7 expanded afterwards.
Xist includes a set of demographic controls: sex, race, age, education, and
marital status. I also control for job characteristics including union status,
occupation, and industry. λst is the time-varying state characteristics includ-
ing state monthly unemployment rate, and state quarterly personal income
percentage change. State fixed effects θs and month fixed effects γt are also
added. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. The coefficient of
interest is β1, which measures the impact of the ACA Medicaid expansion on
the job mobility of childless adults.
12The job separation during the 8 months break (between interview month 4 and 5) is
unobservable.
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The DD strategy described above is valid if job mobility in expansion
states and non-expansion states would have trended similarly in the absence of
the ACA Medicaid expansion after controlling for individual characteristics,
state time-varying and time-invariant effects. To formally test the parallel
trend assumption, I replace the Postst with a series of year dummies and in-
teract them with the expansion dummy. To be specific, I estimate the following
regression.
Separatedist = Φ(α+
∑
τ 6=2013
βτ (1{year = τ}×Expansions) + β2Xist + β3λst
+ θs + γt + εist) (3.2)
1{year = τ} are year dummies for each year before and after the Med-
icaid expansion13. β2013 is normalized to zero so βτ can be interpreted as
changes in job mobility relative to 2013.
The outcome variable for the previous DD strategy is job separation.
To further understand the job transitions, I separate the event of job separa-
tion into 4 categories according to respondents’ beginning employment status
in interview month 1 and ending employment status in interview month 4
(4-month sample) or month 8 (8-month sample): transition to full-time job,
transition to part-time job, transition to unemployment, and transition to
13For the 4-month sample, β2011, β2012, β2014, β2015, β2016 are estimated. For the 8-month
sample, β2012, β2014, β2015, β2016 are estimated.
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leaving the labor force. Then I use a multinomial logit model to estimate
how the probability of each job transitions are affected by the ACA Medicaid
expansion.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 The DD Estimates of the ACA Medicaid Expansion on Child-
less Adults’ Job Mobility
Figure 7 and figure 8 display the job separation trends in expansion
states and non-expansion states for the 4-month sample and the 8-month
sample. The graphs show that the overall childless adults’ job mobility of
expansion states and non-expansion states follow a similar trend prior to the
expansion. Non-expansion states’ average job mobility is relatively flat over-
time. It was larger than the expansion states’ average job mobility prior to
the expansion. This difference shrank to zero after 2014. A larger jump is
witnessed in the 8-month sample. Table 14 shows the basic DD effects of the
ACA Medicaid expansion without any controls. The raw pre and post expan-
sion differences show a small increase in job mobility for non-expansion states,
and a larger increase for expansion states. The raw Difference-in-difference
is calculated as 0.36% for the 4-month sample, and 0.74% for the 8-month
sample.
The Baseline DD results for both 4-month sample and 8-month sample
are presented in Table 15 with 4-month estimates presented in columns (1)
to (3) and 8-month estimates presented in columns (4) to (6). The columns
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(1) and (4) are specifications including only state and time fixed effects. The
columns (2) and (5) add individual characteristics and job characteristics in-
cluding sex, race, education, age, marital status, union status, occupation and
industry. The columns (3) and (6) also control for time-varying state character-
istics including state monthly unemployment rate and state monthly personal
income percentage change. The estimates are generally consistent with the
raw differences in Table 14. It is estimated that the ACA Medicaid expansion
led to a 0.32% increase (or 7.2% increase from the mean of 4.47%) in the job
mobility over 4-month period and a 0.73% increase (or 9.7% increase from the
mean of 7.52%) in the job mobility over 8-month period. These estimates are
consistent with previous papers that also find a moderate and significant effect
of public health insurance on job mobility of certain populations groups (e.g.,
Bansak and Raphel (2005) find that the SCHIP led to a 5-6% increase in job
turnover of men; Hamersma and Kim (2009) find that the parental Medicaid
expansion led to a 4% increase in job turnover of unmarried mothers).
The time trend estimates are plotted in Figure 9 and Figure 10 (the
estimates are presented in Table 19). In Figure 9, the coefficients for year
2011 and 2012 are insignificant and close to zero which supports the validity
of the DD design. The coefficients for year 2014 to 2016 become positive and
they are larger in magnitude than the lead coefficients, although they are not
significant except for year 2016. In Figure 10, the coefficient for year 2012
is again close to zero. The coefficients for year 2014 to 2016 have positive
signs. The magnitude of year 2014 estimate is not as big as year 2015 and
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2016 estimates. This is partly due to the fact that in the 8-month sample, the
individuals observed in 2014 had fewer months interviewed after January 2014
than those observed in 2015 and 2016.
The ACA Medicaid expansion may have heterogeneous effects on dif-
ferent population groups. I analyze the heterogeneous effects by looking at
various subgroups. The sample is stratified by gender, age, education, and
race. The subgroup analysis by gender and age is presented in Table 16.
There is a larger increase in men’s job mobility compared to women over the
8-month interviews while there is no significant difference in their job mobility
changes over the 4 months period. The increase in job mobility of childless
adults 50 or older is much larger and more accurately estimated which sug-
gest that the ACA Medicaid expansion has a bigger impact on relatively older
childless adults. Table 17 shows the effects by education attainment. The
estimates are bigger for childless adults with high school education or less
compared to those that received higher education. They are consistent with
previous research that also find bigger impact on less educated individuals,
since less educated individuals are less likely to obtain employer-sponsored
health insurance across a job change. Table 18 shows the effects by race. The
expansion led to a significantly increase in the job mobility of whites. The
job mobility of the blacks seems to be unaffected. The estimates for asian are
larger in magnitude but are not accurately estimated.
The validity of the results depends on the identification assumption
that there are no contemporaneous labor market shocks at state-time level
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that affect expansion and non-expansion states differently. I estimate two
additional models as falsification/robustness tests. First, I present the DD
estimates using parents as my sample instead of childless adults. Since parents
were the traditional beneficiaries of Medicaid, I expect smaller or zero impact
of the ACA Medicaid expasion on their job mobility. Second, I re-estimate
the main regression with a sample that excludes 7 late adopting states. The
concern is that the timing of the policy change of these late adopting states
may be correlated with these states’ labor market outcomes. The results of
the falsification/robustness tests are presented in Table 20. The results for
parents are reported in panel b. The estimates are small and statistically
insignificant as expected. Panel c reports the results after dropping 7 late
adopting states. The estimates are generally similar in magnitude compare to
the baseline results.
3.5.2 Job Transitions
One question is that whether the increased job mobility represents al-
leviated “job lock” effect (i.e., workers are more likely to switch jobs when
health insurance is not a concern), or alleviated “employment lock” effect (i.e.,
workers are more likely to quit jobs and become unemployment or leave the
labor force). Results in Table 21 show that the increase in job mobility comes
entirely from increase in job-to-job transitions. In the short run (4-month
sample), the effect is concentrated on transitions into full time jobs. When
considering a longer period (8-month sample), there is a large and significant
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increase in the probability of transitions into part time jobs (0.32% increase,
or 20% increase from the mean). I find no evidence of “employment lock”, the
estimates on Transition-to-Unemployment and Transition-to-Leave LF tran-
sitions are small and in most cases in the opposite direction. The results on
“employment lock” are consistent with many previous research on Medicaid
expansion and labor supply which find that the ACA Medicaid expansion have
no impact on labor market outcomes including labor force participation, em-
ployment, and hours worked. However, these results contradict with studies
on single early adopting state that find significant “employment lock” effect
(e.g., Kim, 2016; Garthwaite, Gross, and Notowidigdo, 2014).
3.6 Conclusion
The interaction between public health insurance coverage and labor
market decisions for childless adults is less studied because they were not the
traditional beneficiaries of public health insurance. The ACA Medicaid ex-
pansion in 2014 increased the Medicaid income eligibility threshold to 138%
of the FPL for everyone including childless adults. The availability of Medi-
caid may produce incentives for workers to alter their labor market decisions.
This paper studies how the expansion affect childless adults’ job mobility. The
expansion may increase workers’ job mobility if they are “locked” into their
current job for fear of losing employer-sponsored health insurance. This hy-
pothesis is tested using a DD identification strategy. Results show that the
ACA Medicaid expansion increased the childless adults’ job mobility by 7% -
61
9%, and the increase comes entirely from job-to-job transitions.
This paper is not without limitations. One concern is that the Medi-
caid expansion or the ACA in general may have induced firm-side responses
that affect firms’ layoff decisions. Unfortunately the CPS do not provide in-
formation on voluntary vs involuntary job separation which can be used to
disentangle the firm-side responses. Another limitation of the data is that
the job switches data in CPS may have substantial amount of noises due to
coding errors as pointed out by Kambourov and Manovskii (2004). Thus, fu-
ture studies could be done using alternative data set such as Survey of Income
and Program Participation (SIPP) if available. This paper finds no evidence
of “employment lock” which is consistent with previous research on the ACA
Medicaid expansion and childless adults’ labor supply. However, there maybe
lags in labor market responses. Future research could look at long-run impact
when data is available.
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Figures
Figure 1: ACA Mandate on Health Insurance Coverage, DD Pre and Post
Trends
Notes: This figure presents the difference in health insurance coverage among
treated and control groups, relative to 2009. DD estimates come from re-
gression similar to equation (2.1) but uses the interaction between the year
dummies and Treatit instead of Treatit × Postit. Panel a: health insurance
coverage from any source; panel bparental ESI coverage; panel c: ESI own-
name coverage; panel d: private purchased health insurance coverage.
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Figure 2: ACA Mandate on Job Mobility, DD Pre and Post Trends
Notes: This figure presents the difference in job mobility among treated and
control groups, relative to 2009. DD estimates come from regression similar to
equation (2.1) but uses the interaction between the year dummies and Treatit
instead of Treatit×Postit. Panel a: the overall sample; panel bjob lock sample;
panel c: job push sample.
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Figure 3: Health Insurance Coverage Age Profiles, ACA RD
Notes: This figure presents the means of health insurance coverage rate by age
in months. The dots are the means of health insurance coverage rate at each
age in months relative to age of 26. Panel a: health insurance coverage from
any source; panel bparental ESI coverage; panel c: ESI own-name coverage;
panel d: private purchased health insurance coverage.
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Figure 4: Job Mobility Age Profiles, ACA RD
Notes: This figure presents the means of job turnover rate by age in months.
The dots are the means of job turnover rate at each age in months relative to
age of 26. Panel a: the overall sample; panel bjob lock sample; panel c: job
push sample.
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Figure 5: State Medicaid Expansion Decisions, December 2016
Source: the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation
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Figure 6: Medicaid Coverage Trends Among Childless Adults 2011-2016
Notes: This figure presents the childless adults’ Medicaid coverage rate from
2011 to 2016 in expansion and non-expansion states. Data are from the CPS
March Supplement 2011-2016. Sample restricted to adults between ages 26
and 64, who do not have children under age 19.
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Figure 7: Job Mobility among the Expansion States and Non-expansion States,
4-month Sample
Notes: This figure presents the childless adults’ job mobility from 2011 to 2016
in expansion and non-expansion states. Only those who have non-missing first
4 months records enter the sample. Sample restricted to non-institutionalized,
civilian adults between ages 26 and 64, who are employed and do not have
children under age 19. Data are from the basic monthly CPS from January
2011 to December 2016.
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Figure 8: Job Mobility among the Expansion States and Non-expansion States,
8-month Sample
Notes: This figure presents the childless adults’ job mobility from 2011 to
2016 in expansion and non-expansion states. Only those who have non-missing
records for all the interview months enter the sample. Sample restricted to
non-institutionalized, civilian adults between ages 26 and 64, who are employed
and do not have children under age 19. Data are from the basic monthly CPS
from January 2011 to December 2016.
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Figure 9: Difference in Job Mobility between Expansion and Non-expansion
States, relative to 2013, 4-month Sample
Notes: This figure presents the DD estimates of βτ from equation (3.2) for
the 4-month sample. β2013 is the benchmark and is set to zero. The ACA
Medicaid Expansion took effective in January 2014. Robust standard errors
are clustered at state level.
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Figure 10: Difference in Job Mobility between Expansion and Non-expansion
States, relative to 2013, 8-month Sample
Notes: This figure presents the DD estimates of βτ from equation (3.2) for
the 8-month sample. β2013 is the benchmark and is set to zero. The ACA
Medicaid Expansion took effective in January 2014. Robust standard errors
are clustered at state level.
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Tables
Table 1: State Level Dependent Coverage Mandate Laws
State Age Limit(Year Increase) Implementation Requirement Requirement
Student/Non student (Unmarried) (No Children)
Colorado 25(1)/25(6) 2006 Y
Connecticut 26(3)/19(0) 2009 Y
Delaware 24(0)/24(5) 2007 Y
Florida 30(5)/25(6) 2007 Y Y
Georgia 26(3)/19(0) 2006 Y
Idaho 25(2)/21(2) 2007 Y
Illinois 26(2)/26(7) 2008 Y
Indiana 24(0)/24(4) 2007
Iowa 24(0)/24(5) 2008 Y
Kentucky 25(2)/25(6) 2008 Y
Louisiana 24(1)/19(0) 2009 Y
Maine 25(2)/25(6) 2007 Y Y
Maryland 25(2)/25(6) 2008 Y
Massachusetts 26(2)/21(2) 2007
Minnesota 25(2)/25(6) 2008 Y
Montana 25(2)/25(6) 2008 Y
Nebraska 30(7)/30(11) 2010 Y
Nevada 24(2)/19(0) 1995 Y
New Hampshire 26(4)/26(7) 2007 Y
New Jersey 30(7)/30(11) 2006 Y Y
New Mexico 25(0)/25(6) 2003 Y
New York 30(7)/30(11) 2009 Y
North Dakota 26(3)/22(3) 1995 Y
Ohio 28(5)/28(9) 2010 Y
Pennsylvania 30(7)/30(11) 2010 Y Y
Rhode Island 25(2)/19(0) 2007 Y
South Dakota 30(7)/19(0) 2007
Tennessee 24(1)/24(5) 2008 Y
Texas unlimited/25(6) 2004 Y
Utah 26(3)/26(7) 1995 Y
Virginia 25(2)/25(6) 2007 Y
Washington 25(2)/25(6) 2007 Y
West Virginia 25(1)/25(6) 2007 Y
Wisconsin 27(4)/27(8) 2010 Y
Source: Authors’ review of public records available through offices of
state insurance commissioners and National Conference of State Legis-
latures.
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Table 2: The State Mandates Sample Summary Statistics
Overall ESI (own)
Yes (Job Lock) No (Job Push)
Variable mean sd mean sd mean sd
Job Separation 0.125 0.330 0.045 0.207 0.179 0.383
ESIown 0.425 0.494
Hourly Wage 13.030 7.571 15.963 8.557 9.990 4.703
Tenure 26.529 29.889 34.512 31.665 18.830 25.989
Union 0.074 0.262 0.120 0.325 0.029 0.168
Spouse with ESI 0.119 0.324 0.121 0.327 0.026 0.160
Married 0.304 0.460 0.351 0.477 0.224 0.417
Have Children 0.211 0.408 0.220 0.414 0.215 0.411
High School less 0.076 0.265 0.034 0.180 0.173 0.378
High School 0.289 0.453 0.248 0.432 0.395 0.489
Some College 0.403 0.491 0.362 0.481 0.354 0.478
College or More 0.232 0.422 0.356 0.479 0.078 0.268
Male 0.519 0.500 0.536 0.499 0.543 0.498
Female 0.481 0.500 0.464 0.499 0.457 0.498
White 0.806 0.396 0.814 0.389 0.760 0.427
Black 0.117 0.321 0.108 0.310 0.158 0.365
Other Race 0.077 0.267 0.078 0.268 0.082 0.274
Notes: Data are from the 2001, 2004, and 2008 SIPP panels from year
2000 to year 2010. Sample restricted to employed individuals from 19
to 30 years old who are not from Hawaii, did not move to other states,
and are not recipients of public health insurance or benefits.
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Table 3: State Mandates on Health Insurance Coverage
19-30 19-30 Workers Controls %Full ins.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Any Source 0.0320*** 0.0235** 0.0197** 0.0643***
(0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.021)
Means 0.62 0.70 0.70 0.70
ESI(parents) 0.0611*** 0.0525*** 0.0522*** 0.1330***
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.019)
Means 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.16
ESI(own) -0.0251* -0.0237* -0.0269* -0.0464*
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.026)
Means 0.33 0.45 0.45 0.45
Purchase -0.0028 -0.0017 -0.0025 -0.0145
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.011)
Means 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04
Government -0.0011
(0.005)
Means 0.03
Job Control X X
State× Year FE X X X X
Eligible × Year FE X X X X
Eligible × State FE X X X X
N 353,919 258,092 247,715 245,897
Notes: Only the DDD estimators are shown. Column (1) uses the 19-30
year olds as the sample. Column (2) restricts sample to 19-30 workers.
Column (1) and (2) add unemployment rate and demographic controls
including sex, race, age, education, marital status, indicator of having
children, and indicator of whether spouse has ESI or not. Column (3)
and (4) add additional job controls including log hourly wage, tenure,
union status, firm size, occupation, and industry. Column (4) also
interacts the percentage of people enrolled in full-insured plans with
the DDD estimator. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4: State Mandates on Overall Job Mobility, Job Lock, and Job Push
19-30 Workers Controls %Full ins.
(1) (2) (3)
Job Mobility -0.0024 -0.0042 -0.0127**
(0.004) (0.003) (0.006)
Means 0.12 0.12 0.12
N 258,092 247,715 247,715
Job Lock 0.0031 0.0030 0.0045
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Means 0.05 0.05 0.05
N 113,047 110,023 110,023
Job Push -0.0105** -0.0100** -0.0288***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.011)
Means 0.18 0.18 0.18
N 145,045 137,692 137,692
Job Control X X
State× Year FE X X X
Eligible × Year FE X X X
Eligible × State FE X X X
Notes: Only the DDD estimators are shown. Column (1) controls for
unemployment rate and demographics including sex, race, age, edu-
cation, marital status, indicator of having children, and indicator of
whether spouse has ESI or not. Column (2) and (3) add additional
job controls including log hourly wage, tenure, union status, firm size,
occupation, and industry. Column (3) also interacts the percentage of
people enrolled in full-insured plans with the DDD estimator. Standard
errors are clustered at the state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5: State Robustness Checks
Overall Job Mobility Job Lock Job Push
a. Baseline Results
DDD -0.0042 0.0030 -0.0100**
(0.003) (0.002) (0.005)
Means 0.12 0.05 0.18
b. Voluntary Job Separation
DDD -0.0020 0.0045** -0.0080*
(0.003) (0.002) (0.005)
Means 0.08 0.04 0.12
c. Involuntary Job Separation
DDD -0.0012 -0.0009 -0.0021
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Means 0.04 0.01 0.06
d. Drop 2008-2010
DDD -0.0110** -0.0034 -0.0110**
(0.005) (0.004) (0.006)
Means 0.13 0.05 0.20
e. Separate Sample by Pre-mandate ESI Status
DDD -0.0030 -0.0027 -0.0106
(0.004) (0.020) (0.011)
Means 0.13 0.06 0.17
Notes: Only the DDD estimators are shown. Panel a shows baseline
results from Table?? column (2). Panel b uses voluntary job separa-
tion as dependent variable. Panel c uses involuntary job separation as
dependent variable. Panel d drop sample observations from 2008 to
2010. Panel e separate individuals into job lock and job push sample
using their pre-mandate ESI status. Standard errors are clustered at
the state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6: State Falsification Tests
Overall Job Mobility Job Lock Job Push
a. Baseline Results
DDD -0.0042 0.0030 -0.0100**
(0.003) (0.002) (0.005)
Means 0.12 0.05 0.18
b. Use Ineligible Older Cohorts
DDD 0.0002 0.0010 -0.0032
(0.006) (0.004) (0.009)
Means 0.09 0.04 0.16
c. Placebo Mandate Dates
DDD 0.0014 -0.0020 0.0049
(0.004) (0.003) (0.005)
Means 0.12 0.05 0.18
Notes: Only the DDD estimators are shown. Panel a shows baseline
results from Table?? column (2). Panel b restricts sample to young
adults who are not eligible for the mandates because of age. Panel
c randomly assigns the dates that states implemented the mandates.
Standard errors are clustered at the state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1
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Table 7: The ACA Mandate Sample Summary Statistics
Overall ESI (own)
Yes (Job Lock) No (Job Push)
Variable mean sd mean sd mean sd
Job Separation 0.086 0.281 0.031 0.173 0.135 0.342
ESIown 0.348 0.476
Hourly Wage 15.545 8.935 18.664 9.952 12.763 6.804
Tenure 32.365 31.788 38.120 31.546 27.242 31.119
Union 0.076 0.265 0.116 0.320 0.040 0.198
Spouse with ESI 0.122 0.327 0.113 0.317 0.126 0.332
Married 0.320 0.466 0.327 0.469 0.316 0.465
Have Children 0.217 0.412 0.163 0.369 0.247 0.431
High School less 0.065 0.265 0.017 0.180 0.091 0.378
High School 0.264 0.441 0.187 0.390 0.306 0.460
Some College 0.370 0.482 0.332 0.471 0.390 0.487
College or More 0.301 0.458 0.464 0.498 0.213 0.409
Male 0.503 0.500 0.536 0.543 0.472 0.498
Female 0.497 0.500 0.464 0.457 0.528 0.499
White 0.779 0.396 0.814 0.389 0.772 0.427
Black 0.121 0.327 0.094 0.293 0.136 0.342
Other Race 0.098 0.298 0.092 0.289 0.102 0.303
Notes: Data are from the 2008 SIPP panel. Sample restricted to em-
ployed individuals from 24 to 28 years old who are not from Hawaii,
did not move to other states, and are not recipients of public health
insurance or benefits.
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Table 8: The ACA Mandate on Health Insurance Coverage, DD Estimates
24-28 24-28 Workers Controls States Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Any Source 0.0487*** 0.0393*** 0.0440*** 0.0197**
(0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.009)
Means 0.58 0.67 0.70
ESI(parents) 0.0959*** 0.0998*** 0.0981*** 0.0522***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Means 0.12 0.11 0.16
ESI(own) -0.0484*** -0.0605*** -0.0596*** -0.0269*
(0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
Means 0.36 0.48 0.45
Purchase -0.0090* -0.0047 -0.0028 -0.0025
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005)
Means 0.05 0.04 0.04
Government 0.0028
(0.003)
Means 0.03
Job Control X X
State FE X X X X
Year FE X X X X
N 80,462 59,017 55,848 247,715
Notes: Only the DD estimators are shown. Column (1) uses the 24-28
year olds as the sample. Column (2) restricts sample to 24-28 workers.
Column (1) and (2) add unemployment rate and demographic controls
including sex, race, age, education, marital status, indicator of having
children, and indicator of whether spouse has ESI or not. Column (3)
adds additional job controls including log hourly wage, tenure, union
status, firm size, occupation, and industry. Standard errors are clus-
tered at the state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 9: The ACA Mandate on Overall Job Mobility, Job Lock, and Job Push,
DD Estimates
24-28 Workers Controls State Results
(1) (2) (3))
Job Mobility -0.0087* -0.0101** -0.0042
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Means 0.09 0.09 0.12
Job Lock -0.0029 -0.0048 0.0030
(0.006) (0.005) (0.002)
Means 0.03 0.03 0.05
Job Push -0.0117 -0.0146** -0.0100**
(0.008) (0.006) (0.005)
Means 0.15 0.15 0.18
Job Control X X
State FE X X X
Year FE X X X
Notes: Only the DD estimators are shown. Column (1) controls for un-
employment rate and demographics including sex, race, age, education,
marital status, indicator of having children, and indicator of whether
spouse has ESI or not. Column (2) adds additional job controls includ-
ing log hourly wage, tenure, union status, firm size, occupation, and
industry. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 10: The ACA Mandate on Health Insurance Coverage and Job Mobility,
RD Parametric Estimates
Quadratic Controls Pre 2011
(1) (2) (3)
a. Health Insurance
Any Source -0.0248* -0.0141 0.0056
(0.014) (0.016) (0.012)
ESI(parents) -0.0415*** -0.0360*** -0.0073
(0.009) (0.012) (0.008)
ESI(own) 0.0193 0.0246 -0.0042
(0.014) (0.017) (0.012)
Purchase 0.0057 0.0120 0.0084
(0.006) (0.008) (0.005)
Government 0.0037 -0.0033 0.0048
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
b. Job Mobility
Overall Job Mobility 0.0150* 0.0128 0.0082
(0.008) (0.043) (0.009)
Job Lock 0.0004 0.0004 0.0064
(0.010) (0.015) (0.007)
Job Push 0.0326** 0.0269** 0.0065
(0.013) (0.013) (0.015)
Controls X X
Notes: Column (1) uses the quadratic polynomial function. Column (2)
and (3) add controls including sex, race, age, education, marital status,
indicator of having children, indicator of whether spouse has ESI or
not, log hourly wage, tenure, union status, firm size, occupation, and
industry. Column (2) uses data from 2011 to 2013. Column (3) uses
data from September 2008 to September 2010. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1
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Table 11: State Medicaid Expansion Status and Eligibility Thresholds for
Childless Adults
State Expand Medicaid Expansion Date Eligibility Thresholds
Before After
Alabama
Alaska X 9/1/2015 138%
Arizona X 1/1/2014 110% 138%
Arkansas X 1/1/2014 138%
California X 1/1/2014 138%
Colorado X 1/1/2014 10% 138%
Connecticut X 1/1/2014 56% 138%
Delaware X 1/1/2014 110% 138%
District of Columbia X 1/1/2014 215% 215%
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii X 1/1/2014 100% 138%
Idaho
Illinois X 1/1/2014 138%
Indiana X 2/1/2015 138%
Iowa X 1/1/2014 138%
Kansas
Kentucky X 1/1/2014 138%
Louisiana X 6/1/2016 138%
Maine
Maryland X 1/1/2014 138%
Massachusetts X 1/1/2014 138%
Michigan X 4/1/2014 138%
Minnesota X 1/1/2014 75% 138%
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana X 1/1/2016 138%
Nebraska
Nevada X 1/1/2014 138%
New Hampshire X 8/1/2014 138%
New Jersey X 1/1/2014 138%
New Mexico X 1/1/2014 138%
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New York X 1/1/2014 100% 138%
North Carolina
North Dakota X 1/1/2014 138%
Ohio X 1/1/2014 138%
Oklahoma
Oregon X 1/1/2014 138%
Pennsylvania X 1/1/2015 138%
Rhode Island X 1/1/2014 138%
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont X 1/1/2014 150% 138%
Virginia
Washington X 1/1/2014 138%
West Virginia X 1/1/2014 138%
Wisconsin 100%
Wyoming
Source: The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation and Search Results
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. Notes: California has two
programs: the Medicaid Coverage Expansion (133% FPL) and the
Health Care Coverage Initiative (133%- 200% FPL), both offer lim-
ited benefits than Medicaid.Wisconsin did not expand Medicaid, but
amended its Medicaid state plan and existing Section 1115 waiver raise
the eligibility threshold to 100% for childless adults.
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Table 11: continued.
Table 12: 4-Month Sample Summary Statistics
Pre-expansion Post-expansion
Treated Control Treated Control
Job Separation 0.041 0.045 0.046 0.046
Married 0.550 0.568 0.548 0.554
Age 50.4 50.6 50.7 50.8
High School dropout 0.073 0.089 0.073 0.091
High School 0.322 0.326 0.313 0.317
Some College or more 0.605 0.585 0.614 0.592
Male 0.496 0.492 0.496 0.490
Female 0.504 0.508 0.504 0.510
White 0.869 0.825 0.864 0.807
Black 0.071 0.137 0.070 0.156
Asian 0.035 0.014 0.038 0.015
Other Race 0.025 0.024 0.028 0.023
Monthly State Unemployment 0.081 0.072 0.056 0.052
Quarterly State Income Change (%) 0.777 0.738 0.923 0.832
Observations 90,212 64,481 93,900 70,006
Notes: Data are from the basic monthly CPS from January 2011 to De-
cember 2016. Only those who have non-missing first 4 months records
enter the sample. Sample restricted to non-institutionalized, civilian
adults between ages 26 and 64, who are employed and do not have
children under age 19. 9 early adopting states are excluded from the
sample. Job separation is defined as whether the respondent left his/her
job during the first 4 months of interviews. The monthly unemployment
rate data are seasonally-adjusted, and obtained from the Bureau of La-
bor Statistics. The state quarterly income per capita growth rate are
seasonally-adjusted, in current dollars, and obtained from the Bureau
of Economic Analysis.
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Table 13: 8-Month Sample Summary Statistics
Pre-expansion Post-expansion
Treated Control Treated Control
Job Separation 0.069 0.076 0.079 0.078
Married 0.585 0.603 0.580 0.584
Age 51.7 51.9 52.1 52.1
High School dropout 0.072 0.087 0.073 0.095
High School 0.325 0.328 0.312 0.314
Some College or more 0.603 0.585 0.615 0.591
Male 0.490 0.484 0.490 0.483
Female 0.510 0.516 0.510 0.517
White 0.881 0.834 0.872 0.818
Black 0.062 0.131 0.065 0.150
Asian 0.034 0.014 0.038 0.012
Other Race 0.023 0.021 0.025 0.020
Monthly State Unemployment 0.081 0.072 0.059 0.054
Quarterly State Income Change (%) 0.803 0.760 1.053 0.976
Observations 22,187 15,988 36,638 26,027
Notes: Data are from the basic monthly CPS from January 2011
to December 2016. Only those who have non-missing records for
all the interview months enter the sample.Sample restricted to non-
institutionalized, civilian adults between ages 26 and 64, who are em-
ployed and do not have children under age 19. 9 early adopting states
are excluded from the sample. Job separation is defined as whether the
respondent left his/her job during the 8 interview months. The monthly
unemployment rate data are seasonally-adjusted, and obtained from
the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The state quarterly income per capita
growth rate are seasonally-adjusted, in current dollars, and obtained
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
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Table 14: Basic Difference-in-difference Effects
a. 4-month Sample
Non-expansion States Expansion States Difference
Pre-expansion 4.499% 4.142% -0.357%
Post-expansion 4.620% 4.623% 0.003%
Difference 0.121% 0.481% 0.36%
b. 8-month Sample
Non-expansion States Expansion States Difference
Pre-expansion 7.580% 6.941% -0.639%
Post-expansion 7.815% 7.916% 0.101%
Difference 0.235% 0.975% 0.740%
Notes: Data are from the basic monthly CPS from January 2011 to
December 2016. Job separation in the 4-month sample is defined as
whether the respondent left his/her job during the first 4 months of
interviews, while job separation in the 8-month sample is defined as
whether the respondent left his/her job during the 8 interview months.
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Table 16: Effects of Medicaid Expansion on Childless Adults’ Job Mobility by
Sex and Age
Men Women Less than 50 50 or older
(1) (2) (3) (4)
a. 4-month Sample
Post×Expansion 0.0032 0.0031 0.0024 0.0037**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Means 0.0451 0.0443 0.0516 0.0401
N 164,724 153,875 132,131 186,468
b. 8-month Sample
Post×Expansion 0.0100** 0.0043 0.0036 0.0094**
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Means 0.0760 0.0743 0.0846 0.0696
N 51,428 49,412 36,949 63,891
Notes: Marginal effects are reported in the table. Only the DD esti-
mators are shown. Columns (1) and (2) stratify the sample by sex;
columns (3) and (4) stratify the sample by age. Regressions control
for demographics, job characteristics, state time-varying characteris-
tics, state fixed effects, and month fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered at the state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 17: Effects of Medicaid Expansion on Childless Adults’ Job Mobility by
Education
High School Dropout High School Some College or More
(1) (2) (3)
a. 4-month Sample
Post×Expansion 0.0030 0.0045* 0.0025
(0.008) (0.003) (0.002)
Means 0.0485 0.0417 0.0458
N 15,509 93,818 209,272
b. 8-month Sample
Post×Expansion 0.0336* 0.0078 0.0054
(0.017) (0.006) (0.004)
Means 0.0759 0.0690 0.0778
N 5,043 30,357 65,403
Notes: Marginal effects are reported in the table. Only the DD esti-
mators are shown. Columns (1), (2), and (3) stratify the sample by
education attainment. Regressions control for demographics, job char-
acteristics, state time-varying characteristics, state fixed effects, and
month fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 18: Effects of Medicaid Expansion on Childless Adults’ Job Mobility by
Race
White Black Asian Other Race
(1) (2) (3) (4)
a. 4-month Sample
Post×Expansion 0.0038** -0.0058 0.0074 0.0037
(0.002) (0.005) (0.014) (0.009)
Means 0.0446 0.0457 0.0420 0.0484
N 275,086 27,321 8,775 7,139
b. 8-month Sample
Post×Expansion 0.0083** -0.0028 0.0603 -0.0069
(0.004) (0.011) (0.038) (0.026)
Means 0.0753 0.0751 0.0692 0.0780
N 87,868 8,108 2,603 1,951
Notes: Marginal effects are reported in the table. Only the DD esti-
mators are shown. Columns (1), (2), (3), and (4) stratify the sample
by race. Regressions control for demographics, job characteristics, state
time-varying characteristics, state fixed effects, and month fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered at the state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1
91
Table 19: Time Trend estimates of Effects of the ACA Medicaid Expansion
on Childless adults’ job mobility
4-month Sample 8-month Sample
(1) (2)
Expansion×Year 2016 0.0027* 0.0073**
(0.002) (0.003)
Expansion×Year 2015 0.0017 0.0086***
(0.002) (0.003)
Expansion×Year 2014 0.0013 0.0026
(0.002) (0.003)
Expansion×Year 2012 -0.0012 -0.0001
(0.002) (0.004)
Expansion×Year 2011 -0.0008
(0.002)
N 318,599 100,840
Notes: Marginal effects are reported in the table. Estimates report
the coefficients on the interaction term between year indicators and
expansion indicators. Regressions control for demographics, job char-
acteristics, state time-varying characteristics, state fixed effects, and
month fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 20: Robustness and Falsification Tests Restuls
4-month Sample 8-month Sample
(1) (2)
a. Baseline Results
Post×Expansion 0.0032** 0.0073***
(0.001) (0.003)
Means 0.0447 0.0752
N 318,599 100,840
b. Parents’ Job Mobility
Post×Expansion 0.0006 -0.0049
(0.002) (0.006)
Means 0.0448 0.0788
N 206,932 63,510
c. Drop Late Adopting States
Post×Expansion 0.0034** 0.0071**
(0.002) (0.003)
Means 0.0449 0.0757
N 266,424 83,991
Notes: Marginal effects are reported in the table. Only the DD es-
timators are shown. Panel a reports estimates from Table 15. Panel
b reports estimates using parents as the sample. Parents are non-
institutionalized, civilian adults between ages 26 and 64, who are em-
ployed and have children under age 19. Panel c reports estimates drop-
ping 7 late adopting states. Regressions control for demographics, job
characteristics, state time-varying characteristics, state fixed effects,
and month fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state
level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 21: Effects of the ACA Medicaid Expansion on Job Transitions
4-month Sample 8-month Sample
(1) (2)
a. Transition-to-Full-Time-Job
Post×Expansion 0.0031** 0.0049*
(0.001) (0.003)
Means 0.0387 0.0608
b. Transition-to-Part-Time-Job
Post×Expansion 0.0000 0.0032**
(0.000) (0.001)
Means 0.0112 0.0160
c. Transition-to-Unemployment
Post×Expansion -0.0000 -0.0006
(0.000) (0.007)
Means 0.0011 0.0025
d. Transition-to-Leave LF
Post×Expansion 0.0000 -0.0002
(0.000) (0.001)
Means 0.0012 0.0040
N 318,599 100,840
Notes: Marginal effects are reported in the table. Estimates are from a
multinomial logit regression that controls for demographics, job char-
acteristics, state time-varying characteristics, state fixed effects, and
month fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix
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Appendix 1
Using Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP)
SIPP is conducted in waves and rotation groups. Each panel is divided
into waves, a four month long periods. Respondents are divided into four
rotation groups. Each group is interviewed one by one on a rotation basis over
each wave. The survey data covers reference periods which is a four month
period preceding the time of the interview for each rotation group in a given
wave. A graphical depiction of the wave and rotation basis for a SIPP sample
panel is presented below. R stands for rotation groups and W stands for
wave. The dark blue month is the interview month. In the first wave, rotation
group 1 is interviewed in January, rotation group 2 is interviewed in February,
rotation group 3 is interviewed in March, and rotation group 4 is interviewed
in April. The interviewers collect their information not only on the interview
month, but also on the previous three months preceding the interview month,
which is the light blue and green months in the graph below. The rotation
begins in May for the Wave 2. To avoid measurement errors associated with
respondents’ recollection and “sim bias”, I turn the monthly data into wave
level data. I only keep the respondents’ individual characteristics and job
characteristics in the beginning month of each wave. My main job mobility
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dependent variable is whether the respondents separate from their job during
each wave.
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